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The concept of separation of powers is inherent in both the
United States and Washington State Constitutions, although neither
document explicitly provides for it. A critical component of the
separation of powers doctrine is a recognition by each government
branch of its appropriate sphere of activity. Historically, courts have
recognized the appropriate sphere of judicial activity by adopting
various doctrines deferring exercise of the full judicial power. Scholars
and courts usually refer to these deferring mechanisms as judicial
restraint. The exercise of judicial restraint has not always been perfect,
as befits the necessary tension between the constitutional branches of
government inherent in the concept of "checks and balances."
But in recent years, for a variety of reasons, the appropriate roles
of the three constitutional branches have become increasingly more
difficult to define. In the judicial branch, judicial activists of both the
left and the right have emerged; many judges see themselves as quasi-
legislators with the right to speak out on all issues, possessing a broad
charge to right all wrongs. Courts are tempted to avoid judicial
restraint and resolve any and all controversies litigants may choose to
present to the judicial system. In an era of populist criticism of
government and general distrust of policymaking by statute or rule,
this temptation is further reinforced for certain judges doctrinally
oriented toward the individualized, nongeneral decisionmaking that the
common law offers. The result of such judicial activism is untoward
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and inappropriate involvement by the courts in political questions and
partisan conflicts. In effect, what has emerged too often is a cowboy
judiciary riding roughshod over separation of powers in its zeal to save
every damsel in distress and to right every wrong.
The resultant risk of the courts' unwillingness or inability to
define the appropriate scope of judicial responsibility or to respect
notions of judicial restraint is that citizens will view the courts as just
another partisan branch of government. Courts will lose their station
as impartial resolvers of conflict. To the extent the courts become
more like the partisan branches of government and the aura of judicial
impartiality disappears, the respect of the people for the courts, and
thus the courts' authority, will erode.1
We see today some of the consequences of the judiciary's
proceeding beyond its core functions. The executive and legislative
branches have questioned the core functions of the judiciary, such as
judicial review or sentencing in criminal cases, and attacked the
independence of the judiciary: "Politicians have long blamed judges
for forcing them to take unpopular actions ... but many of those
politicians had enough respect for the courts that they were careful not
to take their criticism too far. Today, however, politicians criticize
judges for the purpose of intimidating them and getting specific
results. "'2
Features of such efforts threatening judicial independence include
legislative attempts to curtail court jurisdiction, heaping on the courts
additional responsibilities without providing the necessary resources,
politicizing judicial selection, and withholding proper compensation.
Escalating judicial campaign costs only make these problems worse for
judges.
1. Courts are not representative bodies. They are not designed to be a good reflex of
a democratic society. Their judgment is best informed, and therefore most dependable,
within narrow limits. Their essential quality is detachment, founded on independence.
History teaches that the independence of the judiciary is jeopardized when courts
become embroiled in the passions of the day and assume primary responsibility in
choosing between competing political, economic and social pressures.
Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 525 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
2. Stephen B. Bright, Political Attacks on the Judiciary: Can Justice Be Done Amid Efforts
to Intimidate and Remove Judges from Office for Unpopular Decisions?, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 308, 310
(1997). Erwin Chemerinsky, When Do Lawmakers Threaten Judicial Independence? TRIAL, Nov.
1998, at 62-71 (Professor Chemerinsky suggests eight circumstances which threaten judicial
independence: legislation undermining institutional functioning of the courts, legislation directing
results in specific cases, legislation directing procedures in specific cases of classes of cases,
legislation restricting court jurisdiction, legislation restricting court remedies, legislation restricting
traditional judicial discretion, legislation assigning nonjudicial functions to the courts, and
legislation changing substantive law in response to court decisions).
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In this Article, I draw on my legislative and judicial background
to focus both on the tendency of the courts to exceed their core
constitutional role and the implications of such judicial activism. I
contend that modern courts of general jurisdiction are too often
embroiled in sociopolitical controversies best left to the political
branches of government. Part I addresses the concept of judicial
restraint in our constitutional system and the need to define the core
powers of the judicial branch of government. Part II discusses
principles of judicial restraint in the federal courts. Part III, using the
example of Washington State where the judiciary enjoys broad
jurisdiction typical of most state court systems,3 analyzes judicial
restraint principles in a general jurisdiction court system. Part IV
examines several recent Washington cases exploring these principles.
Finally, because courts must confine themselves to their appropriate
sphere of action, in Part V I will propose a new, overarching principle
of justiciability for courts of general jurisdiction, incorporating
principles of judicial restraint.
I. JUDICIAL RESTRAINT AND LEGITIMACY IN COURT
DECISIONMAKING
A. The Core Functions of the Courts
The foremost reason for restraint by the judiciary, particularly in
controversies with significant political overtones, is the separation of
powers inherent in our political structure. Our American constitution-
al system envisions three distinct and competing branches of govern-
ment providing "checks and balances" to the inaction or aggressive
tendencies of the other branches. Additionally, this system assumes
that each branch will give appropriate deference to another in matters
constituting the core of the other branch's function. Thus, identifica-
tion of the core functions of the judicial branch of government is the
first step in this analysis.
The most significant court function is dispute resolution; courts
are designed to resolve disputes so that the litigants do not resort to
private remedies, including violence, to vindicate their interests. In
this process, courts assign culpability for behaviors and offer redress to
litigants adversely affected by the culpable conduct of others. On the
civil side, private interests are generally at stake; on the criminal side,
3. See WASH. CONST. art. IV, §§ 4, 6. Under art. IV, § 6, for example, Washington's
superior courts have jurisdiction over all matters in law and equity provided the amount in
controversy exceeds $3,000.
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because of significant public ramifications of the conduct, the public
interest is affected and the State acts as the litigant.
For centuries, Anglo-American courts, with their adversarial
system, have functioned effectively, resolving litigants' disputes by
determining culpability. The evidentiary hearing before either judge
or jury, with its elaborately evolved rules of evidence, is a finely tuned
instrument for deciding who did what to whom.4
But, while we may feel some high degree of confidence in our
procedures for determining culpability, we must admit to decidedly less
certainty when courts attempt to determine remedies. Consider, for
example, the inherent imprecision of attempts to compensate with
money for pain and suffering, a lost limb, emotional distress, or future
lost profits. If determining appropriate remedies in cases involving the
ordinary business of the courts is so fraught with difficulty, imagine
how much more difficult it is for courts to fashion remedies for
ongoing intractable political or social problems. For this reason, courts
should exercise restraint in deciding such controversies.
The discussions of judicial restraint in earlier literature have
focused on decisions generally without differentiating between assessing
culpability and fashioning remedies.' It is in the area of remedies that
the judicial process finds its greatest challenges. The courts are not
readily capable of managing the resolution of large-scale political
problems. Judges are ill-suited to the role of managers because the
courts require deliberation and elaborate process before decisions can
be made. The dictates of due process tend to be inconsistent with the
typically more immediate operational needs of a business enterprise, a
social services organization, or a school system. By its nature, the
common law process is not the best means for establishing complex
societal policies. What judges may consider is confined to the record
developed in court through the testimony of witnesses, frequently
experts retained by the parties. They cannot possibly broker the
complete array of interests inherent in many issues.6 While courts can
4. While courts do a generally effective job of resolving disputes, it is noteworthy that the
increasing cost and delay associated with civil case decisionmaking in recent times have helped
create a competitor to court decisionmaking in civil cases in the form of alternative dispute
resolution (ADR). ADR, whether mediation or arbitration, represents an increasingly important
private alternative to public civil justice in America. Eric Lawson, Jr., Alternative Dispute
Resolution, 69 N.Y. ST. B.J. 18 (Dec. 1997) (noting "phenomenal growth" of ADR in the last
twenty-five years).
5. See infra note 13.
6. The Washington Supreme Court has recognized this fact repeatedly. Niece v. Elmview
Group Home, 131 Wash. 2d 39, 58-59, 929 P.2d 420, 430-31 (1997); Burkhart v. Harrod, 110
Wash. 2d 381, 385, 755 P.2d 759, 761 (1988) ("[W]e fully concur in the statement that 'of the
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be effective in deciding that a wrong has been committed or someone
is culpable, they are less effective at fashioning remedies for major
political or social controversies.
Another core function of the courts is vindication of individual
interests against majoritarian impulses to tyranny.' Notwithstanding
a policy of judicial restraint, this antimajoritarian policy remains a vital,
core judicial function often at odds with the principle of limiting court
access. Courts must enforce individual liberties and interests against
collective needs. In fact, the power of the common law rests in its
individualized decisionmaking and its "policy" or ability to create a"rule" based on individual sets of facts. Emblematic of this core
function is the duty of Washington courts to safeguard the individual
liberties articulated by Washington's constitutional framers in our
constitution's Declaration of Rights.8
Dating back to early common law days, courts have also had as
core functions the inherent power to administer court systems, to
regulate advocates before the courts, to regulate judges themselves,9
three branches of government, the judiciary is the least capable of receiving public input and
resolving broad public policy questions based on a societal consensus."').
7. Alexis de Tocqueville in his great essay, Democracy in America, noted this impulse to
majoritarian tyranny:
Hence the majority in the United States has immense actual power and a power of
opinion which is almost as great. When once its mind is made up on any question,
there are, so to say, no obstacles which can retard, much less halt, its progress and give
it time to hear the wails of those it crushes as it passes.
ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 248 (J.P. Mayer ed. & George Lawrence
trans., Doubleday & Co. 1969) (1850). But de Tocqueville also recognized the antimajoritarian
power of American courts: "Restricted within its limits, the power granted to American courts
to pronounce on the constitutionality of laws is yet one of the most powerful barriers ever erected
against the tyranny of political assemblies." Id. at 103-04. Alexander Hamilton similarly
understood the power of the judiciary:
This independence of the judges is equally requisite to guard the Constitution and
the rights of individuals from the effects of those ill humors which the arts of designing
men, or the influence of particular conjunctures, sometimes disseminate among the
people themselves, and which, though they speedily give place to better information,
and more deliberate reflection, have a tendency, in the meantime, to occasion dangerous
innovations in the government, and serious oppressions of the minor party in the
community.
THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 469 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
8. WASH. CONST. art. I.
9. The Washington Supreme Court said in In re Bruen, 102 Wash. 472, 476, 172 P. 1152,
1153 (1918):
The inherent power of the court is the power to protect itself; the power to
administer justice whether any previous form of remedy had been granted or not; the
power to promulgate rules for its practice, and the power to provide process where none
exists. It is true that the judicial power of this court was created by the constitution,
but upon coming into being under the constitution, this court came into being with
inherent powers. Among the inherent powers is the power to admit to practice, and
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and to develop the common law. The courts in turn apply the law in
a myriad of factual circumstances that even the wisest legislative or
executive policymaker cannot fully anticipate. This role of "nurturing"
the development of the law by common law decisionmaking "enables
the law under stare decisis to grow and change to meet the ever-
changing needs of an ever-changing society and yet, at once, to
preserve the very society which gives it shape."1
Given the dynamics of judicial branch decisionmaking set forth
above, it is not surprising the courts have been criticized, often justly,
for intruding aggressively into the American governmental process.1
Americans bring more and more complex sociopolitical disputes to the
courts for ultimate resolution. Significantly, the courts agree to decide
such issues in many instances in the absence of articulable principles
for deciding whether the power of the courts ought to be employed.
When a court, made up of members little known to the public, using
a process not clearly understood, declares an enactment by a majority
of legislators or the people themselves to be unconstitutional, some
people in the body politic will undoubtedly be upset.1"
Having reviewed the core functions of the judicial branch of
government, I will now examine how constitutional and statutory
principles of judicial restraint relate to those core functions. When
courts stray beyond the traditional confines of those core functions, it
is then that the courts are frequently criticized for judicial activism.
B. Judicial Activism and Judicial Restraint
The criticism of the role of "activist" courts in a democratic
society is, of course, not new.13 However, the temptation of courts
necessarily therefrom the power to disbar from practice, attorneys at law.
10. State ex rel. Washington Fin. Comm. v. Martin, 62 Wash. 2d 645, 673, 384 P.2d 833,
849 (1963) (italicization added).
11. Publications denouncing judicial activism abound. Perhaps most prominent among
recent decriers of judicial interference in political matters is Robert Bork. See generally ROBERT
H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW (1990).
See also Lino A. Graglia, Constitutional Law: A Ruse for Government by an Intellectual Elite, 14
GA. ST. U. L. REV. 767 (1998), and other writings by Professor Graglia. See also MAX BOOT,
OUT OF ORDER: ARROGANCE, CORRUPTION, AND INCOMPETENCE ON THE BENCH (1998).
12. While some of the criticism directed at the unelected federal judiciary may be unfairly
aimed at an elected state judiciary, the institutional remoteness and relative anonymity of elected
judges mean the criticism may still be accurate.
13. See, e.g., ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME
COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS (1962); Charles B. Blackmar, Judicial Activism, 42 ST. LOUIS
U. L.J. 753 (1998); John Paul Stevens, Judicial Restraint, 22 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 437 (1985);
James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 HARV.
L. REV. 129 (1893). Justice Holmes' famous dissent in Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75
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to solve all societal ills has been exacerbated both by the inability or
unwillingness of the more partisan branches of government to address
complex societal issues 4 and the increased willingness of courts to
entertain lawsuits on nearly every conceivable subject. Some in our
society come to the courts precisely for an individualized, case-by-case
determination of policy because they do not trust the collective
establishment of legislative policy by statute or executive policy by
administrative regulation.'" Accordingly, the courts have become the
focus in society for addressing many of our most fundamental and
vexing issues.
Robert Bork eloquently described this problem:
In law, the moment of temptation is the moment of choice, when a
judge realizes that in the case before him his strongly held view of
justice, his political and moral imperative, is not embodied in a
statute or in any provision of the Constitution. He must then
choose between his version of justice and abiding by the American
form of government. Yet the desire to do justice, whose nature
seems to him obvious, is compelling, while the concept of constitu-
tional process is abstract, rather arid, and the abstinence it counsels
[is] unsatisfying. To give in to temptation, this one time, solves an
urgent human problem, and a faint crack appears in the American
foundation. A judge has begun to rule where a legislator should.' 6
The doctrine of judicial restraint has been encrusted in recent
years with considerable ideological cant of both the left and the
right. 7  The ideological discussion highlights particular political
issues of the day. Many conservatives decry judicial activism with
respect to the courts' role in racial desegregation in America or
(1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting), was an early example of opposition to the notion that a court may
interfere with socioeconomic matters that are more properly the domain of the political branches
of government: "But a constitution is not intended to embody a particular economic theory,
whether of paternalism and the organic relation of the citizen to the state or of laissez faire."
Indeed, it was once said, "[I]n the days when the judges ruled, there was a famine in the
land." Ruth 1:1.
14. This inability may be the result of a variety of circumstances including the adversarial
tone of the media, term limits, the exodus of seasoned political leaders from politics, and
campaign financing demands.
15. See Richard A. Posner, The Rise and Fall of Administrative Law, 72 CHI. -KENT L. REV.
953 (1997).
16. BORK, supra note 11, at 1.
17. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 198-222 (1985)
(judicial restraint principles used as code words to criticize federal court involvement in racial
desegregation).
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reproductive rights issues.18 Liberals complain today of judicial
activism in property and economic issues.' 9 But this doctrine need
not be the captive of the left or the right. The doctrine itself has
become "political" largely because it is not susceptible to rigorous and
predictable definition.
That the courts are not entirely trusted by the partisan branches
of government to announce constitutional principles is illustrated by
recent Washington legislation. In 1997, a bill was introduced in the
Washington State House of Representatives with thirty-three sponsors.
The bill challenged the doctrine of judicial review: "The doctrine of
judicial review that the courts have the sole and final say in interpret-
ing the Constitution on behalf of all three branches of government has
been subject to serious analysis and criticism by scholars, jurists, and
others for almost two hundred years."2  The legislation's apparent
intent was to undercut the finality and authority of judicial review of
constitutional questions by permitting the legislature to disagree with
a judicial interpretation of the Washington Constitution and to submit
the issue to the voters in a statewide referendum.2
18. See generally MAX BOOT, OUT OF ORDER: ARROGANCE, CORRUPTION AND
INCOMPETENCE ON THE BENCH (1998).
19. Present-day property rights advocates want courts to be more active, and less deferential
to the other branches, on property decisions. See generally Douglas T. Kendall & Charles P.
Lord, The Takings Project: A Critical Analysis and Assessment of the Progress So Far, 25 B.C.
ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 509 (1998) (describing what the authors dub the "Takings Project," a
pervasive conservative and libertarian agenda to dismantle federal and state environmental and
regulatory law and the role activist judges play in furthering that agenda).
Some conservatives seem to believe the judiciary is not part of "government." In a recent
column, George Will decried the willingness of conservative activists to use the courts to achieve
"microgovernment of society, 'to have the courts' pry open every aspect of life so government can
fine-tune fairness":
[C]an a conservative be content to have courts controlling universities and other
institutions of civil society, permeating their internal operations with government
supervision? The unjust treatment of conservatives does not justify their participation
in today's reflexive recourse to litigation rather than persuasion-politics-to improve
their lot.
George Will, Students' Cause Raises Questions About Government Involvement, SEATTLE POST
INTELLIGENCER, Oct. 22, 1998, at A13.
20. H.R. 2060, 55th Leg., Reg. Sess. § 3(2) (Wash. 1997). This approach is commended
in ROBERT BORK, SLOUCHING TOWARD GOMORRAH: MODERN LIBERALISM AND AMERICAN
DECLINE 117 (1996). In his later years, Thomas Jefferson became a fierce opponent of judicial
review: "The constitution, on this hypothesis, is a mere thing of wax in the hands of the
judiciary, which they may twist and shape into any form they please." Letter to Spencer Roane,
Sept. 6, 1819, in BERNARD SCHWARTZ, A BASIC HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT 110-11
(Louis L. Snyder ed., Robert E. Krieger Pub. 1979) (citing THOMAS JEFFERSON 10, THE
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 140 (Ford ed., 1899)).
21. The proposal had a fatal constitutional infirmity: the legislature may not statutorily
proscribe the authority the Washington Constitution, article IV, section 4 confers upon
1999] Judicial Restraint
The sense that the courts are too powerful sometimes conflicts
with direction to judges from the partisan branches to state their views
more publicly. In 1997, twenty-two sponsors introduced in the
Washington State House of Representatives a measure urging the
Supreme Court to amend Canon 7 of the Code of Judicial Conduct to
afford judges and judicial candidates the right to "speak freely and
without fear of governmental retaliation, on issues that are not then
before the court. 22
The United States Congress has also raised serious questions
about judicial performance through a different methodology. The
United States Senate's recent glacial pace in confirming nominees to
judicial vacancies increases judicial workloads and instills trepidation
in the minds of the nominees. In recent legislation,24 Congress
Washington courts. Gerberding v. Munro, 134 Wash. 2d 188, 191, 949 P.2d 1366, 1368 (1998)
(statute adding qualifications to constitutional offices is unconstitutional); North Bend Stage Line
v. Dep't of Pub. Works, 170 Wash. 217, 222, 16 P.2d 206, 208 (1932). Judicial review was a
firmly entrenched constitutional doctrine in 1889. See Southcenter Joint Venture v. Nat'l
Democratic Policy Comm., 113 Wash. 2d 413, 423, 780 P.2d 1282, 1287 (1989) (interpreting the
Washington Constitution in accordance with constitutional doctrine understood and accepted at
the time of the state's 1889 constitutional convention). The measure also suffered from a further
practical flaw: the question of how the present legislature can adjudge the intent of an earlier
legislature on a bill. But the proposed legislation underscores the general public misperception
of a judiciary poised to seize every opportunity to exercise power.
22. H.R. Mem. 4004, 55th Leg., Sess. (Wash. 1997). The legislation neglected to address
the countervailing constitutional imperative that applies to judges-the right of litigants to an
impartial decisionmaker as a central mandate of Fourteenth Amendment due process. Judges,
speaking out like partisan legislators on every issue of the day, run the real risk of trampling on
litigants' rights to a fair trial when they are not, or appear not to be, impartial. "[T]he floor
established by the Due Process Clause clearly requires a 'fair trial in a fair tribunal' . .. before
a judge with no actual bias against the defendant or interest in the outcome of his particular case."
Bracy v. Gramley, 520 U.S. 899, 904-05 (1997) (citations omitted). As Justice Anthony Kennedy
noted in a recent speech to the American Bar Association: "'The law makes a promise .... The
promise is neutrality. If that promise is broken, the law ceases to exist. All that's left is the
dictate of a tyrant, or a mob."' Joan Biskupic, 2 Justices Defend Judicial Independence, SEATTLE
TIMEs, Dec. 6,1998, at Bi.
It is rather ironic that many of the sponsors of legislation to set aside judicial review want
judges to speak out on all political issues, a seeming conflict. This measure, however, may be
explained by the fact it addresses the particular case of a libertarian Washington Supreme Court
justice disciplined for giving a speech at an antiabortion rally on the steps of Washington's
Legislative Building. See generally In re Sanders, 135 Wash. 2d 175, 955 P.2d 369 (1998); Talbot
D'Alemberte, Searching for the Limits of Judicial Free Speech, 61 TUL. L. REV. 611 (1987); Erwin
Chemerinsky, Is It the Siren's Call?: Judges and Free Speech While Cases Are Pending, 28 LOY.
L.A. L. REV. 831 (1995); Gregory C. O'Brien, Jr., Speech May be Free, and Talk Cheap, But
Judges Can Pay a Heavy Price for Unguarded Expression, 28 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 815 (1995).
23. See WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, THE 1997 YEAR-END REPORT ON THE FEDERAL
JUDICIARY (1998).
24. H.R. 1252 (the Judicial Reform Act), 105th Cong. (1997). See also S. 158, 97th Cong.
(1981); H.R. 3225, 97th Cong. (1981) (restricting jurisdiction in abortion cases); S. 481, 97th
Cong. (1981); H.R. 4756, 97th Cong. (1981) (restricting jurisdiction over cases involving
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sought to restrain "judicial activism" by denying judges cost-of-living
salary adjustments and limiting federal court jurisdiction. Various
versions of the legislation would deny federal courts the power to
release federal prisoners because of bad prison conditions and establish
special procedures to hear challenges to state initiative measures.
In summary, these issues illustrate the need for the courts
continually to revisit and review the core constitutional functions of the
judiciary.2" Within the constitutional sphere, however, the courts
should be active and the other branches of government constrained not
to act unconstitutionally. The judiciary cannot "restrain" itself from
declaring the enactments of legislative bodies violative of constitutional
norms. The courts must vigorously protect individuals, particularly
minorities, from majoritarian tyranny. But this protective role does not
allow the courts to "constitutionalize" every controversy. Judicial self-
restraint lends support to the legitimacy of judicial independence.
In our system of separation of powers, achievement of the
necessary balance between a judiciary vigorous within its constitutional
sphere and independent of the partisan branches of government, and
a judiciary restrained in its inclination to right every wrong, is no easy
task. That necessary balance is, however, the essence of ordered
liberty in the American constitutional system. Likewise, the other
branches of government must regard the authority and independence
of the judiciary by respecting judicial review, properly funding the
courts, and avoiding the imposition of nonjudicial duties or ever-
escalating caseloads. The fulfillment of separation of powers is found
in the principles of restraint employed in the federal and state court
systems.
II. JUDICIAL RESTRAINT IN THE FEDERAL COURTS
Because of the nature of the United States Constitution as a
specific grant of powers to the federal government, the federal courts
have often addressed issues of judicial restraint. "Federal courts are
not courts of general jurisdiction; they have only the power that is
authorized by Article III of the Constitution and the statutes enacted
voluntary school prayer); S. 3386, 85th Cong. (1958) (depriving federal courts of jurisdiction to
review state decisions on who could practice law). See generally Ira Bloom, Prisons, Prisoners, and
Pine Forests: Congress Breaches the Wall Separating Legislative from Judicial Power, 40 ARIZ. L.
REV. 389 (1998); Leonard Ratner, Majoritarian Constraints on Judicial Review: Congressional
Control of Supreme Court Jurisdiction, 27 VILL. L. REV. 929 (1982).
25. The Washington constitutional framers exhorted future generations that "[a] frequent
recurrence to fundamental principles is essential to the security of individual right and the
perpetuity of free government." WASH. CONST. art. I, § 32.
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by Congress pursuant thereto."26  The Constitution and the first
Judiciary Act of 1789, as amended, constrain and prescribe the
jurisdiction of the federal courts. The federal courts have distin-
guished, however, two aspects of these constraints. The first is subject
matter jurisdiction, flowing directly from the Constitution and the
Federal Judiciary Act. The second involves the concept of justiciabili-
ty, where a court may find jurisdiction but choose not to exercise it.
Jurisdiction, quite simply, is the power to hear and decide a case.
From the beginning, the United States Supreme Court has taken a
limited view of its jurisdiction. The Court has noted that it lacks
subject matter jurisdiction under Article III, Section 2 of the United
States Constitution to decide matters that are not cases or controver-
sies. 27  Federal courts will presume the absence of jurisdiction unless
grounds for jurisdiction appear in the record.28  Subject matter
jurisdiction in federal courts must be affirmatively pleaded and
proved.29
An additional constitutional ground preventing federal courts from
deciding a case is known as the political question doctrine, a reflection
of separation of powers concerns. Conventionally, the political
question doctrine applies to matters that are or ought to be the sole
concern of the coordinate branches of government.3"
26. Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 541 (1986).
27. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, states:
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this
Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made,
under their Authority;-to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and
Consuls;-to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction;-to Controversies to
which the United States shall be a Party;-to Controversies between two or more
States;-between a State and Citizens of another State;-between Citizens of different
States;-between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under Grants of different
States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or
Subjects.
As the United States Supreme Court stated in Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 94 (1968): "The
jurisdiction of federal courts is defined and limited by Article III of the Constitution. In terms
relevant to the question for decision in this case, the judicial power of federal courts is
constitutionally restricted to 'cases' and 'controversies."' See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498,
(1975) ("The issues must arise out of an actual and current case or controversy between adverse
litigants. Adjudication of hypothetical or removed disputes would result in advisory opin-
ions-which federal courts may not do.").
28. Lehigh Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Kelly, 160 U.S. 327, 337 (1895).
29. FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(1).
30. The seminal federal political question case, Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962),
addressed gerrymandered voter districting by the Tennessee legislature. The United States
Supreme Court there noted the key issues to be analyzed in deciding whether or not to confront
a political question:
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Stemming from the case or controversy requirement, the Supreme
Court has promulgated several self-limiting doctrines, not found
specifically in the text of the Constitution, which are generally
subsumed under the rubric of justiciability.3 In fact, over the past
few decades, the Supreme Court has expanded the reach of these
justiciability doctrines with an eye toward increasing judicial restraint
in the federal courts. The federal courts will generally not hear cases
that are moot,32 lack ripeness,33 require advisory opinions,3 4 or in
It is apparent that several formulations which vary slightly according to the settings
in which the questions arise may describe a political question, although each has one or
more elements which identify it as essentially a function of the separation of powers.
Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is found a
textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political
department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving
it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind
clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court's undertaking
independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches
of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision
already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements
by various departments on one question.
Baker, 369 U.S. at 217.
The political question doctrine relates to the subject matter of a controversy. For reasons
of separation of powers, deference to the more democratic branches of government with superior
expertise as to a particular issue, or a desire to carefully protect the nonpolitical legitimacy of the
judiciary in the public eye, the courts deem certain issues outside the purview of the judicial
process; such questions are best left to the political process. See generally Alexander M. Bickel,
The Passive Virtues, 75 HARV. L. REV. 40 (1961); Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Justiciability and
Separation of Powers: A Neo-Federalist Approach, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 393, 498-511 (1996).
Examples of political questions include issues arising under article IV, section 4 of the United
States Constitution, Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224 (1993) (impeachment process);
Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979) (foreign policy); O'Brien v. Brown, 409 U.S. 1 (1972)
(electoral issues and party delegate selection); Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939) (process for
constitutional amendment); Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 302 (1918) (foreign
policy); Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849) (Republican Form of Government Clause).
31. The lower federal courts, of course, exist only by virtue of statute, and their jurisdiction
is entirely prescribed by Congress.
32. In Princeton Univ. v. Schmid, 455 U.S. 100, 103 (1982), the United States Supreme
Court said that a case is moot when the controversy between the parties ceases to be definite and
concrete and when a court's decision no longer affects the litigant's rights. The case or
controversy standard of Article III forecloses the issuance of advisory opinions. Id. See also Sec.
& Exchange Comm'n v. Medical Comm. for Human Rights, 404 U.S. 403, 406-07 (1972); Hall
v. Renla, 396 U.S. 45, 48 (1969). Chief Justice Rehnquist has argued, however, that mootness
is largely grounded in prudential concerns because the Court can address certain cases that are
technically moot under the concept of "capable of repetition, yet evading review" despite the case
or controversy mandate of Article III. Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 330 (1988) (Rehnquist, C.J.,
concurring).
This view has some force given the exceptions to mootness carved out by the federal courts.
These include wrongs capable of repetition, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 113-14 (1973), and
Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U.S. 147, 149 (1975); cases with secondary or collateral consequences,
Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 54-56 (1968); voluntary cessation of activities capable of being
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which the plaintiff lacks standing.35 Justiciability constraints consti-
tute the essence of judicial restraint: a court choosing not to decide an
issue otherwise properly before it for reasons not flowing from the
constitutional text or statutory bases of the court's jurisdiction.
As a result of these constitutional and statutory constraints, the
federal courts have developed a jurisprudence that filters a wide variety
of nonjusticiable cases out of federal courts. Federal courts, then, are
courts of both constitutionally and statutorily limited jurisdiction. But
even in the federal system, with its more rigorous jurisdictional
imperative, criticism of the imprecise articulation of these justiciability
doctrines abounds. Justice O'Connor succinctly expressed the current
state of these doctrines:
All of the doctrines that cluster about Article III-not only standing
but mootness, ripeness, political question and the like-relate in
part, and in different though overlapping ways, to an idea, which is
more than an intuition but less than a rigorous and explicit theory,
resumed, United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 632 (1953); or class actions, Sosna v.
Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 399 (1975).
33. In United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 89-90 (1947), the Court stated that
a case is ripe for review when the issues are fully crystallized, the controversy is concrete, and the
litigants claim actual interference with their rights; hypothetical threats to those rights do not
invoke federal adjudicatory power. Id. Ripeness is designed to forestall judicial entanglement in"abstract disagreements." Abbott Lab. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148 (1967). The federal courts
balance "the hardship to the parties of withholding court consideration" against "the fitness of the
issues for judicial review." Id. at 149. See generally, Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Ripeness and the
Constitution, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 153 (1987). Ripeness is a prudential constraint. The United
States Supreme Court has noted that the ripeness doctrine proceeds both from Article III and
from prudential concerns. Reno v. Catholic Soc. Servs., Inc., 509 U.S. 43, 58 n.18 (1993). The
prudential concerns relate to "problems of prematurity and abstractness" that may prevent proper
adjudication. Socialist Labor Party v. Gilligan, 406 U.S. 588 (1972).
34. In Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 96 (1968), the Court said: "When the federal judicial
power is invoked to pass upon the validity of actions by the Legislative and Executive Branches
of the Government, the rule against advisory opinions implements the separation of powers
prescribed by the Constitution and confines federal courts to the role assigned them by Article
III."
35. In Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750-51 (1984), the Court noted that a plaintiff has
standing to invoke the adjudicatory powers of the federal courts when the plaintiff has a personal
stake in the suit's outcome. The "personal stake" requirement is met where there is a distinct and
palpable (not speculative) injury to the plaintiff, a fairly traceable causal connection exists between
the claimed injury and the challenged conduct, and a substantial likelihood that the relief
requested will redress the claimed injury.
Taxpayer standing issues must also meet the criteria of Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
The expenditure must be an exercise of power under the Taxing and Spending Clause, and the
expenditure must violate a specific constitutional provision that limits the taxing and spending
power, such as the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. Id. at 101-06.
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about the constitutional and prudential limits to the powers of an
36unelected, unrepresentative judiciary in our kind of government.
To the extent federal justiciability doctrines are malleable,
allowing the federal courts significant latitude in their interpretation,
the courts can arbitrarily pick and choose the circumstances in which
they are applied. The exercise of federal judicial power on such purely
arbitrary grounds may legitimately be criticized as unsound theoretical-
ly and unworkable practically.37 This doctrine of justiciability may
be neither a doctrine nor a restraint of federal judicial power.
Critics have suggested federal justiciability doctrines (1) involve
arbitrary characterizations or overlap, (2) are unrelated to their original
policy purposes not clearly resting on constitutional or prudential
grounds, and (3) may be utilized to evade or mask the true issue in a
case. For example, Professor Erwin Chemerinsky advocates scrapping
the various federal justiciability doctrines in favor of the following
four-part test:
(1) Is the plaintiff legally entitled to relief under the appropriate
constitutional, statutory, or treaty provision, regulation, or common
law rule? (2) Is there a sufficient likelihood that a federal court
ruling for the claimant will have some effect? (3) Should the litigant
be allowed to raise the claims of others not before the court? and (4)
Is the claim based on a constitutional provision that the judiciary
should not enforce (assuming such provisions should exist)?3"
Perhaps a new paradigm for federal justiciability questions, as well as
those in general jurisdiction courts, may be needed.
Notwithstanding criticisms of federal justiciability jurisprudence
as courts of specified jurisdiction, the federal courts more often struggle
with principles of judicial restraint. Federal justiciability jurisprudence
is therefore more developed than the jurisprudence of restraint in
general jurisdiction state courts.
III. JUDICIAL RESTRAINT IN WASHINGTON STATE COURTS
By contrast with federal courts, Washington courts have few
constraints on their jurisdiction. Article IV of the Washington
Constitution establishes the jurisdiction of the supreme court and the
36. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984) (emphasis added) (quoting Vander Jagt v.
O'Neill, 699 F.2d 1166, 1178-79 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (Bork, J., concurring)).
37. Pushaw, supra note 30, at 464 n.350-51.




superior courts in Sections 4 and 6 respectively.39 Section 6, like
Article III, Section 2 of the United States Constitution, enumerates the
various cases over which the superior court "shall have original
jurisdiction." No "case or controversy" requirement appears in the
text of the constitutional grant of jurisdiction, however, and our courts
have never implied any.4" To the contrary, the Washington Supreme
Court declared from the outset: "[T]he superior courts of this state are
courts of general jurisdiction."'" Nor has the following proposition
39. WASH. CONST. art. IV, § 4 states:
The supreme court shall have original jurisdiction in habeas corpus, and quo
warranto and mandamus as to all state officers, and appellate jurisdiction in all actions
and proceedings, excepting that its appellate jurisdiction shall not extend to civil actions
at law for the recovery of money or personal property when the original amount in
controversy, or the value of the property does not exceed the sum of two hundred
dollars ($200) unless the action involves the legality of a tax, impost, assessment, toll,
municipal fine, or the validity of a statute. The supreme court shall also have power
to issue writs of mandamus, review, prohibition, habeas corpus, certiorari and all other
writs necessary and proper to the complete exercise of its appellate and revisory
jurisdiction. Each of the judges shall have power to issue writs of habeas corpus to any
part of the state upon petition by or on behalf of any person held in actual custody, and
may make such writs returnable before himself, or before the supreme court, or before
any superior court of the state or any judge thereof.
WASH. CONST. art. IV, § 6 provides:
Superior courts and district courts have concurrent jurisdiction in cases in equity.
The superior court shall have original jurisdiction in all cases at law which involve the
title or possession of real property, or the legality of any tax, impost, assessment, toll,
or municipal fine, and in all other cases in which the demand or the value of the
property in controversy amounts to three thousand dollars or as otherwise determined
by law, or a lesser sum in excess of the jurisdiction granted to justices of the peace and
other inferior courts, and in all criminal cases amounting to felony, and in all cases of
misdemeanor not otherwise provided for by law; of actions of forcible entry and
detainer; of proceedings in insolvency; of actions to prevent or abate a nuisance; of all
matters of probate, of divorce, and for annulment of marriage; and for such special cases
and proceedings as are not otherwise provided for. The superior court shall also have
original jurisdiction in all cases and of all proceedings in which jurisdiction shall not
have been by law vested exclusively in some other court; and said court shall have the
power of naturalization and to issue papers therefor. They shall have such appellate
jurisdiction in cases arising in justices' and other inferior courts in their respective
counties as may be prescribed by law. They shall always be open, except on nonjudicial
days, and their process shall extend to all parts of the state. Said courts and their judges
shall have power to issue writs of mandamus, quo warranto, review, certiorari,
prohibition, and writs of habeas corpus, on petition by or on behalf of any person in
actual custody in their respective counties. Injunctions and writs of prohibition and of
habeas corpus may be issued and served on legal holidays and nonjudicial days.
40. Some states have judicially imposed a case or controversy requirement even though none
appears in the state constitution. See, e.g., Petition of Anonymous 1, 558 N.W.2d 784, 790 (Neb.
1997).
41. State v. Jones, 2 Wash. 662, 665, 27 P. 452, 453 (1891). General jurisdiction is
distinguished from limited jurisdiction in the following way:
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been in doubt over the last 100 years: "At all events, it is manifest
that it was not the intention of the framers of this [Washington
Constitution, art. IV,] § 6 to exclude any sort or manner of causes from
the jurisdiction of the superior court. 4 2
From the dawn of this state, Washington courts have been
without the subject matter jurisdictional constraints of the federal
courts. There is no requirement in the Washington Rules of Civil
Procedure or in the rules pertaining to courts of limited jurisdiction
analogous to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(1) to plead the basis
for jurisdiction. Nor is subject matter jurisdiction often a matter of
concern for a court of general jurisdiction:43 "The superior courts
have broad and comprehensive original jurisdiction over all claims
which are not within the exclusive jurisdiction of another court.
Because of this specific constitutional grant of jurisdiction, exceptions
to this broad jurisdiction will be read narrowly.""
Because Washington courts of general jurisdiction lack the
institutional deterrents to finding jurisdiction the federal courts
routinely employ, Washington judges have a perceived imperative to
decide. This, of course, is not necessarily a bad thing. The Washing-
ton Supreme Court is almost always the court of last resort for disputes
arising under Washington law and plainly has an obligation to clarify
and harmonize the law of the state, as well as to correct errors in the
lower courts. Nevertheless, the imperative to decide disputes needs to
be tempered by due consideration of the judiciary's role as one of the
three coordinate branches of state government.
Washington courts, though not compelled to employ the language
of judicial restraint as are federal courts facing the mandate of Article
III, nevertheless have discussed principles of judicial restraint. The
discussion has involved terms utilized at the federal level such as
mootness, ripeness, political question and the like, but the content of
the terms is often strikingly different in the state setting. Washington
courts have often chosen to use the more amorphous term "justiciabili-
A court's general jurisdiction of the case is the right to exercise judicial power over
that class of cases, and such jurisdiction extends to all controversies which may be
brought before a court within the legal bounds of rights and remedies. Limited or
special jurisdiction, on the other hand, is jurisdiction which is confined to particular
cases, or which can be exercised only under the limitations and circumstances prescribed
by the statute.
21 C.J.S. Courts § 9(a) (1990) (footnotes omitted).
42. Krieschel v. Bd. of Snohomish Cty. Comm'rs, 12 Wash. 428, 439, 41 P. 186, 189
(1895).
43. WASH. CONST. art. IV, § 6.
44. Orwick v. City of Seattle, 103 Wash. 2d 249, 251, 692 P.2d 793, 795 (1984).
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ty" in lieu of a separate analysis of the traditional restraint doctrines.
Some of these voluntary restraint policies are based on constitutional
principles such as separation of powers. Many of the policies are not
constitutional but prudential in nature, reflecting goals of economical
use of judicial resources or other policies. What is lacking in our law
is an overarching principle of judicial restraint.
A. Constitutional Constraints
1. Separation of Powers
The principal constitutional limitation in Washington on the
exercise of judicial power in political cases is the separation of powers
doctrine. As the Washington Supreme Court in Lenci v. City of
Seattle4" cogently put it, "These rules are more than mere rules of
judicial convenience. They mark the line of demarcation between
legislative and judicial functions."" Chief Justice Frank Hale was
more pithy in his sense of the doctrine:
A good restraint among many to be practiced by the judiciary
is to curb its tendency to act as a miniparliament. Not only do the
constitutions mandate this, but the common law, and common sense
as well, ordains it. Aside from the Bill of Rights, the separation of
powers of government into three separate functions probably
represents the highest achievement of constitutional theory. A basic
tenet of the separation of powers proposition is that legislators shall
enact the laws and judges shall interpret, apply and enforce them.
In brief, legislators should legislate and judges should adjudicate and
neither ought do the other. There is a practical as well as constitu-
tional basis for this idea, I think, because, no matter how great the
temptation or exalted the claimed purpose, when courts legislate
they usually do a bad job of it-and in the long run invite legislative
reprisal."
The Washington Constitution provides for three distinct branches
of government, and Washington cases have discussed the circumstanc-
es in which one branch of government has invaded the province of
another branch.4" In In re Salary of Juvenile Director,49 the Wash-
45. 63 Wash. 2d 664, 388 P.2d 926 (1964).
46. Id. at 668, 388 P.2d at 929.
47. State v. Williams, 85 Wash. 2d 29, 34, 530 P.2d 225, 228 (1975) (Hale, C.J.,
dissenting).
48. In re Discipline of Niemi, 117 Wash. 2d 817, 828, 820 P.2d 41 (1991); see, e.g., Zylstra
v. Piva, 85 Wash. 2d 743, 749-50, 539 P.2d 823, 827 (1975) (application of collective bargaining
laws to judicial employees holding that a state senator serving as Judge Pro Tempore did not
violate the separation of powers doctrine).
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ington Supreme Court traced the history of separation of powers under
the United States and Washington Constitutions, holding the salary set
by county commissioners for the juvenile court director was not so low
as to constitute a legislative impairment of the prerogatives of the
judicial branch by depriving that officer of his ability to function."0
In Carrick v. Locke,"' the Washington Supreme Court held the
conduct of a coroner's inquest proceeding by a district court judge did
not violate the separation of powers doctrine, thus articulating a
practical understanding of separation of powers:
One of the fundamental principles of the American constitu-
tional system is that the governmental powers are divided among
three departments-the legislative, the executive, and the judi-
cial-and that each is separate from the other. Washington's
constitution, much like the [F]ederal [C]onstitution, does not
contain a formal separation of powers clause. Nonetheless, the very
division of our government into different branches has been
presumed throughout our state's history to give rise to a vital
separation of powers doctrine. The validity of this doctrine does not
depend on the branches of government being hermetically sealed off
from one another. The different branches must remain partially
intertwined if for no other reason than to maintain an effective
system of checks and balances, as well as an effective government.
The doctrine serves mainly to ensure that the fundamental functions
of each branch remain inviolate.
The separation of powers doctrine is grounded in flexibility
and practicality, and rarely will offer a definitive boundary beyond
which one branch may not tread. 2
Indeed, Washington cases emphasize separation of powers is not a
rigid doctrine.5 3 The party alleging a violation of separation of
powers must demonstrate impairment of a core function of a coordinate
branch of government. 4
49. 87 Wash. 2d 232, 552 P.2d 163 (1976).
50. Id. at 251-52, 552 P.2d at 174-75.
51. 125 Wash. 2d 129, 882 P.2d 173 (1994).
52. Id. at 134-35, 882 P.2d at 176-77 (citations omitted).
53. "[Tihe doctrine of the separation of powers was never intended to create, and certainly
never did create, utterly exclusive spheres of competence. The compartmentalization of
governmental powers among the executive, legislative and judicial branches has never been
watertight." Zylstra, 85 Wash. 2d at 750, 539 P.2d at 827. See also Moran v. State, 88 Wash.
2d 867, 873, 568 P.2d 758, 761 (1977).
54. "The question to be asked is not whether two branches of government engage in
coinciding activities, but rather whether the activity of one branch threatens the independence or
integrity or invades the prerogatives of another." Zylstra, 85 Wash. 2d at 750, 539 P.2d at 827.
See also State v. Blilie, 132 Wash. 2d 484, 489-93, 939 P.2d 691, 693-94 (1997).
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Like the United States Supreme Court in Mistretta v. United
States,5 where the Court upheld judicial involvement in the Sentenc-
ing Commission, Washington has grounded its analysis of separation
of powers in concern for two potential hazards: handling of tasks more
appropriately assigned to other branches of government and invasion
by one branch of government of core functions assigned to another
branch or branches.56 Thus, the doctrine of separation of powers
represents a broad principle, albeit without precise boundaries,
recognizing that not all controversies are cognizable in the courts.5 7
2. Political Questions
Unlike the federal judiciary, which has articulated a political
question doctrine to avoid addressing certain issues, Washington
courts, while exhibiting some reluctance to decide political issues, have
eschewed development of a coherent political question doctrine distinct
from the constitutional concept of separation of powers.58  The
The Washington Supreme Court has clearly indicated, for example, that any encroachment
on its plenary authority to regulate the practice of law steps across the constitutional line. Wash.
State Bar Ass'n v. State, 125 Wash. 2d 901, 902, 890 P.2d 1047, 1048 (1995) (legislative
designation of Bar Association as public employer for purposes of collective bargaining held
unconstitutional); Graham v. State Bar Ass'n, 86 Wash. 2d 624, 633, 548 P.2d 310, 316 (1976)
(no performance audit of Bar Association); see also Wash. State Legis. v. Lowry, 131 Wash. 2d
309, 317-21, 931 P.2d 885, 890-92 (1997) (scope of legislative power over creation of sections in
bills subject to gubernatorial line item veto); Wash. State Motorcycle Dealers Ass'n v. State, 111
Wash. 2d 667, 670, 763 P.2d 442, 443 (1988).
55. 488 U.S. 361 (1989).
56. Carrick, 125 Wash. 2d at 136, 882 P.2d at 177.
57. See generally Stanley H. Friedelbaum, State Courts and the Separation of Powers: A
Venerable Doctrine in Varied Contexts, 61 ALB. L. REV. 1417 (1998).
58. The following Washington cases note without discussion that political questions lie
outside the cognizance of the judiciary: State v. Manussier, 129 Wash. 2d 652, 670, 921 P.2d
473, 481 (1996) (political questions are not within the judicial power to determine); Roehl v. Public
Util. Dist. No. I of Chelan County, 43 Wash. 2d 214, 238, 261 P.2d 92, 104 (1953) (holding that
political questions lie outside the cognizance of the judiciary). See also Gilbreath v. Pacific Coast
Coal & Oil Co., 75 Wash. 2d 255, 259, 450 P.2d 173, 175 (1969) (holding that taxation issues
are a matter of concern for the legislature, and not within the purview of the courts, in the
absence of an attack upon the constitutionality of the legislation involved); Skidmore v. Fuller, 59
Wash. 2d 818, 822, 370 P.2d 975, 977 (1962) (the truth or falsity of the allegations in a recall
demand is a political question to be determined by the voters); Capitol Hill Methodist Church
v. City of Seattle, 52 Wash. 2d 359, 368, 324 P.2d 1113, 1119 (1958) (holding that the power to
vacate streets is a political function which, in the absence of collusion, fraud, or the interference
with a vested right, will not be judicially reviewed); State ex rel. Donohue v. Coe, 49 Wash. 2d
410, 417, 302 P.2d 202, 206 (1956) (holding that determination of questions arising incidental to
the submission of an initiative measure to the voters is a political and not a judicial question,
except when there may be express statutory or written constitutional law making the question
judicial); State ex rel. York v. Bd. of Comm'rs of Walla Walla Cty., 28 Wash. 2d 891, 911, 184
P.2d 577, 588-89 (1947) (holding that protection of the public from unreasonable uses of the
highways is a political question, not a judicial one).
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political question cases in Washington have fallen into several broad
categories: initiatives," recall, 6  political organizations, 6' and gam-
bling.62 But none of these cases offers principled guidance to the law
in Washington.
When Washington courts have actually attempted to state a basis
for their rulings on political questions, they have largely followed the
Baker test.63 More often, Washington courts have simply asserted in
a general fashion that a question is political and beyond the courts'
purview. 64  Thus, it is unclear whether Washington courts see the
59. The constitutionality of the initiative power is a political question, State v. Manussier,
129 Wash. 2d 652, 670-71, 921 P.2d 473, 481-82 (1996), but the courts retain authority to review
the scope of the initiative power, Ford v. Logan, 79 Wash. 2d 147, 151, 483 P.2d 1247, 1249
(1971), and to review certain specific administrative actions of the election officer charged with
administering the initiative process, State ex rel. Donohue v. Coe, 49 Wash. 2d 410, 415-17, 302
P.2d 202, 205-06 (1956).
60. The decision of the voters on a recall demand is a political question. See Skidmore v.
Fuller, 59 Wash. 2d 818, 822, 370 P.2d 975, 977 (1962); Gibson v. Campbell, 136 Wash. 467,
471-72, 241 P. 21, 23 (1925). The courts will, however, screen the factual and legal sufficiency
of charges before their submission to the voters. In re Shipman, 125 Wash. 2d 683, 684-85, 886
P.2d 1127, 1130-31 (1995) (providing charges must be factually sufficient with specific basis for
charges justifying recall, and legally sufficient with specific instances of conduct amounting to
misfeasance, malfeasance, or violation of the oath of office).
61. The courts may review tort and contract claims of a political party member against a
party, but must avoid a party's internal disputes or rules. See Snedigar v. Hodderson, 53 Wash.
App. 476, 480, 768 P.2d 1, 3 (1989), rev'd in part, 114 Wash. 2d 153, 786 P.2d 781 (1990). But
see Marchioro v. Chaney, 90 Wash. 2d 298, 303, 582 P.2d 487, 490 (1978) (holding that party
officials and county party chair have standing to challenge statute on organization of party).
62. Washington courts have declined to review equal protection challenges to gambling
laws, leaving to the legislature the responsibility of deciding which forms of gambling are legal.
See State v. Gedarro, 19 Wash. App. 826, 829, 579 P.2d 949, 951 (1978); Northwest Greyhound
Kennel Ass'n, Inc. v. State, 8 Wash. App. 314, 321, 506 P.2d 878, 882 (1973).
63. See, e.g., Gedarro, 19 Wash. App. at 829-30, 579 P.2d at 51.
64. In State v. Manussier, 129 Wash. 2d 652, 921 P.2d 473 (1996) (quoting Pacific States
Telephone and Telegraph Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118, 151 (1911)), the Washington Supreme
Court, in upholding the constitutionality of a "three-strikes" initiative, rejected an argument on
the constitutionality of the initiative process as applied in that case:
Appellant's argument challenges the constitutionality of the initiative process itself
and thus presents an issue which may be beyond the power of this court to decide. In
Pacific States Telephone and Telegraph Co. v. Oregon, the United States Supreme Court
considered a challenge to the Oregon initiative and referendum process based upon a
claim that it was inconsistent with the Federal Constitution's guarantee of a republican
form of government. In that case, the Court held that the issue was political and
governmental and not within the judicial power to determine:
As the issues presented, in their very essence, are, and have long since by this court
been, definitely determined to be political and governmental, and embraced within
the scope of the powers conferred upon Congress, and not therefore within the
reach of judicial power, it follows that the case presented is not within our
jurisdiction, and the writ of error must therefore be, and it is, dismissed for want
of jurisdiction.
223 U.S. at 151.
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political question doctrine as arising out of constitutional separation of
powers concerns or as the exercise of judicial prudence.
B. Prudential Constraints
Washington courts have developed numerous prudential grounds
for limiting judicial decisionmaking, e.g., justiciability, ripeness,
standing, and deference to the other branches. These grounds join a
variety of other prudential reasons for limiting judicial activity,
although not often thought of in such terms, such as the doctrine of
exhaustion in administrative law,61 the requirement that parties raise
Pacific still represents good law, and earlier cases decided by this court have been
in accord with its holding. See State ex. rel. Mullen v. Howell, 107 Wash. 167, 179,
181 P. 920 (1919); State v. Owen, 97 Wash. 466, 469, 166 P. 793 (1917). Because
appellant's argument does not satisfactorily address the power of the court to decide an
otherwise political or governmental issue, we decline to rule on it in this case.
State v. Manussier, 129 Wash. 2d 670-71, 921 P.2d 481-82.
65. Classic examples of judicial restraint are present in administrative law. These include
limiting court intrusion into the specialized decisionmaking of administrative bodies and requiring
litigants to pursue available and effective administrative remedies before actions may be filed in
court:
The exhaustion requirement (1) prevents premature interruption of the administrative
process; (2) allows the agency to develop the factual background on which to base a
decision; (3) allows the exercise of agency expertise; (4) provides a more efficient process
and allows the agency to correct its own mistake; and (5) insures that individuals are not
encouraged to ignore administrative procedures by resort to the courts.
Citizens for Clean Air v. City of Spokane, 114 Wash. 2d 20, 30, 785 P.2d 447, 453 (1990). See
also Estate of Friedman v. Pierce Cty., 112 Wash. 2d 68, 78, 768 P.2d 462, 467 (1989); Orion
Corp. v. State, 103 Wash. 2d 441, 456, 693 P.2d 1369, 1378 (1985).
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies reflects practical concerns. The courts
reinforce the expertise of the administrative entity designed to address certain controversies and
avoid the expenditure of judicial resources when the administrative body may effectively, and
finally, resolve the issue. The rule has been memorialized in the judicial review provisions of the
Washington Administrative Procedure Act. WASH. REV. CODE § 34.05.554 (1998). It provides,
with limited exceptions, that issues not raised before an agency may not be raised on review. Id.
See also WASH. REV. CODE § 34.05.586 (1998) (stating that a party may not assert a defense to
an enforcement action not raised in the substantive agency action).
Important corollaries to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies are the doctrine
of primary jurisdiction and the rule of priority. These doctrines have their roots in separation of
powers. Where an executive branch agency has special expertise on an issue, the courts defer to
the agency in resolving factual or legal issues within that sphere of expertise. Dioxin/Organo-
chlorine Ctr. v. Dep't of Ecology, 119 Wash. 2d 761, 775, 837 P.2d 1007, 1015 (1992). Where
both the courts and an administrative agency have jurisdiction over a question, the courts have
chosen to apply the doctrine of priority, deferring resolution of the issue to the administrative
tribunal:
The priority of action rule applies to administrative agencies and the courts. It
generally applies only if the two cases involved are identical as to (1) subject matter; (2)
parties; and (3) relief. The identity must be such that a decision of the controversy by
one tribunal would, as res judicata, bar further proceedings in the other tribunal.
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issues at trial to preserve them for appeal,66 and the standard of
review in appellate practice. 67
City of Yakima v. Int'l Ass'n of Fire Fighters, AFL-CIO, Local 469, 117 Wash. 2d 655, 675,
818 P.2d 1076, 1086 (1991) (footnotes omitted).
66. Similarly, to obtain review of an evidentiary issue, a party must object on proper
grounds to the trial court's ruling. WASH. R. EVID. 103(a). A party must also object to the
giving or failure to give the instruction to the trial court. WASH. R. Civ. P. 51(f). These policies
are designed to afford a trial court the full opportunity to know of and correct possibly erroneous
decisions.
A party may not raise most alleged errors for the first time on appeal, but must instead
present such errors to the trial court or lower appellate court for consideration. WASH. R. APP.
P. 2.5(a). This rule again reflects a policy of conserving judicial resources and forcing litigants
to fully articulate their positions as early as possible for resolution. The original reason for the
rule that appellate courts will not consider issues the parties did not raise in the trial court seems
to have stemmed from solicitude for the unfortunate position of trial judges whose judgments
were reversed on appeal. "In the 1200's complaints against judgments took the form of semi-
criminal proceedings against the judges." Edson R. Sunderland, Improvement of Appellate
Procedure, 26 IOWA L. REV. 3, 7 (1940). Paragraph 34, § 1, of the Laws of Henry the First
provides:
If anyone through anger or animosity or fear or partiality or greed or for any reason
delivers an unjust judgment or produces any injustice, he shall forfeit 120 shillings and
his rank of thegn and be deprived of every judicial dignity, unless he redeems himself
vis-a-vis the king, according as the latter, in his discretion, decides.
LEGES HENRICI PRIMI 139 (L.J. Downer ed. & trans., 1972). Thus, the original rule was an
expression of fairness to trial judges: they should not be held accountable for rulings on issues
they had no opportunity to decide.
67. In appellate practice, the courts have adopted practical, prudential constraints on judicial
decisionmaking. The standard of review is one example of such a constraint. Appellate courts
generally do not review cases de novo, preferring to rely on trial court decisionmaking.
Historically, English equity courts actually heard appeals de novo. See Kelly Kunsch, Standard
of Review (State and Federal): A Primer, 18 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 11, 15-19 (1994). Deference
to lower court decisions arose for reasons of finality, avoidance of court congestion, and
recognition of trial court expertise and close association with witnesses. Id. at 19-20.
With respect to many trial court decisions, such as evidentiary rulings, discovery decisions,
or other trial procedural matters, the appellate courts give the widest latitude to trial courts'
decisions, overturning them only if there is an abuse of discretion. State ex rel. Carroll v. Junker,
79 Wash. 2d 12, 26, 482 P.2d 775, 784 (1971); Coggle v. Snow, 56 Wash. App. 499, 504, 784
P.2d 554, 557 (1990). This policy is based on judicial economy, given the numerous evidentiary
decisions by trial courts. For trial court factual findings, the decisions are reversible only if
unsupported by substantial evidence. Thorndike v. Hesperian Orchards, Inc., 54 Wash. 2d 570,
573, 343 P.2d 183, 185 (1959).
Finally, only those errors that are "prejudicial," as opposed to "harmless," will result in an
appellate court's altering of a lower court's decision. Dennis J. Sweeney, An Analysis of Harmless
Error in Washington: A Principled Process, 31 GONZ. L. REV. 277, 278 (1995-96) (criticizing lack
of standards for exercise of doctrine, suggesting doctrine is one of expediency). See also ROGER
TRAYNER, THE RIDDLE OF HARMLESS ERROR (1970).
Judicial Restraint
1. Justiciability
Justiciability and ripeness are analogous doctrines in Washington
cases and, indeed, are all too often discussed simultaneously.6 8
Justiciability ordinarily involves concern with whether an issue is
judicially cognizable at all; ripeness, on the other hand, is more readily
associated with the timing of a court action. The Washington
Supreme Court has held that although Washington's Declaratory
Judgment Act69 confers jurisdiction on Washington courts to render
declaratory judgments, the Act does not grant jurisdiction over
nonjusticiable controversies.7" To meet the test of justiciability, there
must be:
(1) . .. an actual, present and existing dispute, or the mature seeds
of one, as distinguished from a possible, dormant, hypothetical,
speculative, or moot disagreement, (2) between parties having
genuine and opposing interests, (3) which involves interests that
must be direct and substantial, rather than potential, theoretical,
abstract[,] or academic, and (4) a judicial determination of which
will be final and conclusive."
This test suggests a case or controversy requirement. Moreover,
despite their general jurisdiction and the Declaratory Judgment Act,
Washington courts generally do not give advisory opinions.
Nevertheless, despite these similarities to federal justiciability
principles, Washington courts may disregard these prudential
68. See, e.g., First United Methodist Church of Seattle v. Hearing Exam'r for Seattle
Landmarks Preservation Bd., 129 Wash. 2d 238, 253-54, 916 P.2d 374, 382 (1996) (Dolliver, J.,
dissenting).
69. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 7.24.010-.020 (1998).
70. Walker v. Munro, 124 Wash. 2d 402, 411, 879 P.2d 920, 926 (1994).
71. Nollette v. Christianson, 115 Wash. 2d 594, 599, 800 P.2d 359, 362 (1990) (citing
Diversified Indus. Dev. Corp. v. Ripley, 82 Wash. 2d 811, 815, 514 P.2d 137, 139 (1973)). See
also City of Spokane v. Taxpayers of Spokane, 111 Wash. 2d 91, 96, 758 P.2d 480, 482 (1988).
72. It should be remembered that this court is not authorized to render advisory
opinions or pronouncements upon abstract or speculative questions under the
declaratory judgment act. The action still must be adversary in character between real
parties and upon real issues, that is, between a plaintiff and defendant having opposing
interests, and the interests must be direct and substantial and involve an actual[,] as
distinguished from a possible or potential dispute, to meet the requirements of
justiciability.
Washington Beauty College, Inc. v. Huse, 195 Wash. 160, 164-65, 80 P.2d 403, 405 (1938).
Despite this policy, Washington courts accept legal questions certified by federal courts.
WASH. R. APP. P. 16.16; WASH. REV. CODE § 2.60.010 (1998). Certified federal questions are
to an extent advisory in nature, although the Washington Supreme Court has indicated that they
are not, due to the live nature of the controversy in federal court and the res judicata effect of the
opinion. In re Elliott, 74 Wash. 2d 600, 610-11, 446 P.2d 347, 354 (1968).
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constraints if the question is one of great public interest.7" Also, the
courts may choose to resolve issues "on the merits" rather than permit
principles of restraint to prevent the resolution of controversies."
2. Ripeness
Ripeness concerns the prematurity of court involvement in an
issue.7" In this respect, it is akin to the concept of exhaustion of
administrative remedies.76 The doctrine is discussed largely in the
land use context. As to the substance of the doctrine, Washington
courts have largely applied the federal test of balancing the fitness of
the issues for judicial decision against the hardship to the parties in not
deciding a matter.77
3. Standing
In federal courts, standing is a requirement for subject matter
jurisdiction.78 In Washington, however, the parties may waive the
question of standing by not submitting it to the trial court.79 If
standing were a question of subject matter jurisdiction in Washington,
the parties could not waive it and an appellate court could hear it
73. State ex rel. Distilled Spirits Inst., Inc. v. Kinnear, 80 Wash. 2d 175, 178, 492 P.2d
1012, 1014 (1972) (providing declaratory relief although the question was not presented to the
court as a declaratory judgment action).
74. Where the question is one of great public interest and has been brought to the
court's attention in the action where it is adequately briefed and argued, and where it
appears that an opinion of the court would be beneficial to the public and to the other
branches of the government, the court may exercise its discretion and render a
declaratory judgment to resolve a question of constitutional interpretation.
Id.
75. First Covenant Church v. City of Seattle, 114 Wash. 2d 392, 398, 787 P.2d 1352, 1355
(1990), vacated, 499 U.S. 901 (1991), reinstated on remand, 120 Wash. 2d 203, 840 P.2d 174
(1992).
76. Sintra, Inc. v. City of Seattle, 119 Wash. 2d 1, 30-31, 829 P.2d 765, 781-82 (1992)
(Utter, J., concurring).
77. First Covenant Church, 114 Wash. 2d at 399, 787 P.2d at 1356 (citing Abbott Lab. v.
Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 149 (1967)). The concurrence in First Covenant Church, however, argued
for a conception of the doctrine different from that articulated in the federal cases, more closely
linking it with finality of decision and exhaustion of remedies. 114 Wash. 2d at 411-12, 787 P.2d
at 1362 (Utter, J., concurring).
78. ACF Indus. v. Cal. State Bd. of Equalization, 42 F.3d 1286, 1291 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing
FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 231 (1990)).
79. Tyler Pipe Indus., Inc. v. Dep'tof Revenue, 105 Wash. 2d 318, 327, 715 P.2d 123, 128
(1986) (standing not considered on appeal because not raised in the trial court), judgment vacated
on other grounds, 483 U.S. 232 (1987).
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anytime or decide it sua sponte.8° Some other state courts treat
standing as a question of subject matter jurisdiction."'
4. Mootness
Washington courts generally hold cases to be moot if the courts
cannot provide either the relief sought by the parties or effective relief
generally.2 The Washington rule in this respect is akin to the federal
rule. It is in the exceptions to the general rule, however, that the
Washington courts part company with their federal counterparts.
The Washington Supreme Court in 1937 adopted a rather fuzzy
exception to mootness: the courts will decide a case that is otherwise
moot if it involves matters of continuing and substantial public
interest.13 This exception has largely swallowed the general rule:
The use of the continuing and substantial public interest
exception in moot cases has increased significantly in the last 15 to
20 years. Apparently first used in Washington in 1937 to issue a
decision in a moot case, the exception has been used in moot cases
at least 34 times by Washington appellate courts. The exception
also seems to have been rejected by a majority or advocated by a
dissent in another 14 cases. The overwhelming number of these
cases has arisen since 1965, with over half of all the public interest
exception cases arising in the 1980's.84
The use of the exception, which is not a picture of analytical clarity,
has not abated."5 As a result, Washington courts have left the
mootness doctrine largely ill-defined.
80. Miller v. St. Regis Paper Co., 366 P.2d 214, 215 (1961), on reh'g, 60 Wash. 2d 484, 374
P.2d 675 (1962); WASH. R. CIV. P. 12(h)(3).
81. See, e.g., Tex. Ass'n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 443 (Tex. 1993)
(also citing cases).
82. Sorenson v. City of Bellingham, 80 Wash. 2d 547, 558, 496 P.2d 512, 518 (1972);
Snohomish Cty. v. State, 69 Wash. App. 655, 660, 850 P.2d 546, 549 (1993).
83. State ex rel. Yakima Amusement Co. v. Yakima Cty., 192 Wash. 179, 183, 73 P.2d 759,
761 (1937).
84. Hart v. Dep't ofSoc. & Health Servs., 111 Wash. 2d 445, 447-48, 759 P.2d 1206, 1208
(1988) (citations omitted).
85. A recent case illustrates the scope of this exception. In State v. J.D., 86 Wash. App.
501, 937 P.2d 630 (1997), a juvenile was apprehended by police after he was seen out past the
time permitted by the Bellingham curfew ordinance. The juvenile was never charged with
violating the curfew ordinance, but was charged with resisting arrest and convicted. Upon appeal,
a deal was struck resulting in a dismissal of all charges. The Washington Court of Appeals
nevertheless issued an opinion finding the curfew ordinance (again under which the juvenile was
never charged) to be unconstitutional. Id. at 510, 937 P.2d at 635. The Washington Supreme
Court initially granted review, State v. Doidge, 134 Wash. 2d 1006, 954 P.2d 277 (1998), but
later withdrew the grant of review and denied reconsideration of its decision, State v. Doidge, 1998
WL 438663 (Wash. Jul. 10, 1998).
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5. Constitutional Interpretation
In the appellate setting in particular, a well-developed policy has
emerged in Washington for avoiding resolution of cases on constitu-
tional grounds when other, nonconstitutional bases to resolve a case
exist." This approach reflects conservatism in adjudication and a
determination not to bring into play our fundamental principles of
government unless absolutely necessary to do so. As Justice Holmes
recognized, declaring legislative enactments unconstitutional "is the
gravest and most delicate duty that this Court is called on to per-
form."8 7 It is all too easy and tempting for judges to wrap themselves
in either the federal or state constitutions to impose their own public
policy preferences.
Washington courts have also aggressively applied independent
state constitutional grounds for resolving issues."8 After State v.
Gunwall, 9 however, Washington courts may not engage in random
constitutional decisionmaking.9 °  In that case, the Washington
Supreme Court established a multipart test to determine if the state
constitution affords more generous protection of citizens' rights than
the Federal Constitution.
6. Deference to Coordinate Branches of Government
in Judicial Review
Perhaps the most commonly employed prudential constraint,91
the reluctance of courts to overturn legislative enactments, arises out
86. Weiss v. Glemp, 127 Wash. 2d 726, 730, 903 P.2d 455, 457 (1995). See also United
States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84, 92 (1985) ("[W]hen a case arrives here by appeal under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1252, this Court will not pass on the constitutionality of an Act of Congress if a construction
of the Act is fairly possible, or some other nonconstitutional ground fairly available, by which the
constitutional question can be avoided.").
87. Blodgett v. Holden, 275 U.S. 142, 148 (1927) (Holmes, J., concurring in per curiam
decision).
88. Robert F. Utter, Freedom and Diversity in a Federal System: Perspectives on State
Constitutions and the Washington Declaration of Rights, 7 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 491 (1984).
89. 106 Wash. 2d 54, 720 P.2d 808 (1986).
90. "[N]aked castings into the constitutional sea are not sufficient to command judicial
consideration and discussion." In re Rosier, 105 Wash. 2d 606, 616, 717 P.2d 1353, 1359 (1986)
(quoting United States v. Phillips, 433 F.2d 1364, 1366 (8th Cir. 1970)).
91. Additional expressions of this rule include the enrolled bill doctrine pursuant to which
Washington courts decline to evaluate the procedure by which bills are enacted in the legislature.
See Citizens Council v. Bjork, 84 Wash. 2d 891, 897-8 n.1, 529 P.2d 1072, 1076 n.1 (1975); Reed
v. Jones, 6 Wash. 452, 458-59, 34 P. 201, 203 (1893). Deference is also accorded to legislative
declarations of an emergency requiring immediate effectiveness of legislation. CLEAN v. State,
130 Wash. 2d 782, 807, 928 P.2d 1054, 1066 (1996).
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of separation of powers concerns. Justice Stone expressed this principle
for the United States Supreme Court:
The power of courts to declare a statute unconstitutional is subject
to two guiding principles of decision which ought never to be absent
from judicial consciousness. One is that courts are concerned only
with the power to enact statutes, not with their wisdom. The other
is that while unconstitutional exercise of power by the executive and
legislative branches of the government is subject to judicial restraint,
the only check upon our own exercise of power is our own sense of
self-restraint. For the removal of unwise laws from the statute
books appeal lies, not to the courts, but to the ballot and to the
processes of democratic government.92
Characteristically, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes said of the role of
judicial review of legislation in a letter to Harold Laski, "[I]f my fellow
citizens want to go to Hell I will help them. It's my job."93 Luther
Martin was undoubtedly correct when he argued during the American
Constitutional Convention, "[a] knowledge of mankind and of
legislative affairs cannot be presumed to belong in a higher degree to
the judges than to the legislature."9 4
Washington cases have expressed this principle of deference to the
more democratic branches of government by suggesting that legislative
enactments will stand absent proof the enactment is unconstitutional
beyond a reasonable doubt; this test is not an evidentiary standard, but
the embodiment of the principle of constitutional deference.9"
92. U.S. v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 78-79 (1936) (Stone, J., dissenting).
93. EUGENE C. GERHART, QUOTE IT! MEMORABLE LEGAL QUOTATIONS 254 (1969).
94. SAUL K. PADOVER, To SECURE THESE BLESSINGS 415-16 (1962).
95. As the Washington Supreme Court stated in Island County v. State, 135 Wash. 2d 141,
146-47, 955 P.2d 377, 380 (1998) (citations omitted):
Our traditional articulation of the standard of review in a case where the constitutional-
ity of a statute is challenged is that a statute is presumed to be constitutional and the
burden is on the party challenging the statute to prove its unconstitutionality beyond
a reasonable doubt. While we adhere to this standard, we take this opportunity to
explain the rationale of such a standard. The "reasonable doubt" standard, when used
in the context of a criminal proceeding as the standard necessary to convict an accused
of a crime, is an evidentiary standard and refers to "'the necessity of reaching a
subjective state of certitude of the facts in issue."'
In contrast, the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard used when a statute is
challenged as unconstitutional refers to the fact that one challenging a statute must, by
argument and research, convince the court that there is no reasonable doubt that the
statute violates the constitution. The reason for this high standard is based on our
respect for the legislative branch of government as a co-equal branch of government,
which, like the court, is sworn to uphold the constitution. We assume the Legislature
considered the constitutionality of its enactments and afford some deference to that
judgment. Additionally, the Legislature speaks for the people and we are hesitant to
1999]
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This prudential constraint is not without controversy. In a recent
concurring opinion, a justice of the Washington Supreme Court argued
for the elimination of any deference to legislative enactments:
[T]oday's majority, which regales itself in legislative deference,
thereby surrenders at least a portion of that righteous power
necessary to check that power exercised by the Legislature. Such
capitulation in the face of unconstitutional legislative usurpation is
no virtue. It eliminates the most important constitutional check
upon legislative abuse. It is license for the strong to vanquish the
weak.
Such surrender, often euphemistically denominated "restraint,"
is sometimes falsely glorified as an aspect of the judiciary's role as
a co-equal branch of government; however, in matters of constitu-
tional law, the judiciary is not co-equal, but supreme.96
This prompted a sharply worded special concurrence from another
member of the court reaffirming the traditional principle of deference:
The concurrence's approach is judicial activism in full flower:
"By judicial activism I mean, quite simply and specifically, the
practice by judges of disallowing policy choices by other governmen-
tal officials or institutions that the Constitution does not clearly
prohibit." ... Unlike the concurrence, I do not believe the
judiciary has a charter, in the guise of constitutional interpretation,
to substitute itself for the executive and legislative branches of
government. We do not have a constitutional mandate to roam
across the governmental landscape[,] changing in our discretion
decisions by other constitutional branches of government with which
we disagree. There is no check, no balance to such unfettered
power. The concurrence offers a paean not only to judicial activism,
but to judicial supremacy in our government. I do not agree with
such a fundamentally flawed notion of judicial power.
Our role is to analyze the Legislature's enactments against the
overarching principles of the constitution, and resolve the dispute
brought to us, as we did in this case. It decidedly is not our
function to express disrespect for coordinate constitutional branches
of government by lightly tossing away their decisions with arrogant
judicial fiat, as the concurrence would have us do.97
strike a duly enacted statute unless fully convinced, after a searching legal analysis, that
the statute violates the constitution. Ultimately, however, the judiciary must make the
decision, as a matter of law, whether a given statute is within the legislature's power to
enact or whether it violates a constitutional mandate.
96. Id. at 165, 955 P.2d at 389 (Sanders, J., concurring).
97. Id. at 174, 955 P.2d at 394 (Talmadge, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
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It is perhaps significant to note that judicial review of the
constitutionality of statutes, although a core judicial function, is one the
judiciary has only sparingly applied out of deference to the coordinate
branches of government. It is incumbent on the other branches to
be equally restrained in employing permissible constitutional checks on
the judiciary.
IV. JUDICIAL RESTRAINT IN RECENT WASHINGTON
STATE CASES
Having reviewed the general theories of judicial independence and
self-restraint, and the application of constitutional and statutory
principles of judicial restraint in federal and Washington state law, we
must turn to how restraint principles are actually applied, or not
applied, in a general jurisdiction state court system like Washington's.
Washington courts have exhibited a tendency to expand the
procedural reach of the judicial power to decide sociopolitical contro-
versies better addressed by the other governmental branches, as recent
case examples illustrate. These recent decisions have expanded judicial
power by fashioning new procedures for court action. The cases also
involve judicial intrusion into issues the judicial process cannot readily
handle.
A. Sociopolitical Controversies
Several recent examples of the Washington courts' role in complex
social issues teach us how easy it is for courts to be drawn into
important sociopolitical controversies, even though courts are ill-
equipped to tackle the magnitude of the problems or weigh the
interests of the competing sociopolitical forces. A prime example of a
case implicating these issues is Seattle School District No. I v. State,99
where Washington's largest school district sued the State over its
failure to provide full funding of common school education pursuant
to the state constitutional mandate that education was the "paramount
duty" of state government. °° The school district sought a declara-
tion that the legislature's reliance on special excess levy funding for
discharging its duty to provide for the education of resident children
was unconstitutional.
98. For instance, Chief Justice John Marshall's only use of judicial review to strike down
a federal statute occurred in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803).
99. 90 Wash. 2d 476, 585 P.2d 71 (1978).
100. Id. at 481, 585 P.2d at 76; WASH. CONST. art. IX, § 1.
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The Washington Supreme Court interpreted the Washington
Constitution to require the legislature to fund education at a higher
level, holding that the State breached its constitutional duty in failing
to fund a "basic education" for Washington students. 1 1  The
Washington Supreme Court did not believe itself constrained by
separation of powers in interpreting the Washington Constitution, and
declined to exercise judicial restraint in declaring a constitutional
violation.102 However, the court declined the invitation of respon-
dents to render "guidelines" for such specific issues as staffing ratios
and employment, special programs, support staff, and the like, leaving
the responsibility of defining and funding such a basic education to the
legislature.0 3  The court stated: "While the Legislature must act
pursuant to the constitutional mandate to discharge its duty, the
general authority to select the means of discharging that duty should
be left to the Legislature."' 0' 4
The dissent in Seattle School District contended the majority had
usurped legislative powers, becoming a "super legislature.""' 5 Justice
Rosellini noted: "[T]he relief sought amounts to no less than a
directive to the members of the legislature to vote, not according to
their consciences or the wishes of their constituents, but according to
the judgment of the majority of this court." ' 6 The dissent suggested
the legislature was better equipped to meet the constitutional mandate,
stating: "A legislature may be a hard horse to harness, but it is not
quite the stubborn mule that a court can be. Most importantly, the
court is not designed or equipped to make public policy decisions, as
this case so forcibly demonstrates. '"107
Other state courts have attempted to compel similar legislative
action. The New Jersey Supreme Court found itself in a quagmire
after issuing a decision in a case analogous to the Seattle School
District case. In Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of
Mount Laurel"8 (Mount Laurel I), the New Jersey Supreme Court
struck down a zoning ordinance on the grounds it failed to provide a
realistic opportunity for low and moderate income housing, which the
101. Id. at 522, 588 P.2d at 97.
102. Id. at 504-10, 585 P.2d at 87-90.
103. Id. at 519-20, 585 P.2d at 95-96.
104. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 90 Wash. 2d at 520, 585 P.2d at 96.
105. Id. at 562-63, 585 P.2d at 119.
106. Id. at 578, 585 P.2d at 127 (Rosellini, J., dissenting).
107. Id. at 564, 585 P.2d at 120 (Rosellini, J., dissenting).
108. 336 A.2d 713 (N.J. 1975).
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court interpreted as a requirement under the New Jersey Constitu-
tion.1"9 The Mount Laurel court promulgated a rule that placed an
affirmative duty on local legislators to enact legislation that would meet
the requirements of the New Jersey Constitution and provided
guidelines for what that legislation should entail.11°  The court
effectively assumed responsibility for housing and zoning policy in that
community."'
Despite the New Jersey court's ruling, the politicians in local
communities continued to allow "exclusionary" zoning ordinances."'
After eight years of universal noncompliance, the New Jersey Supreme
Court was presented with a dilemma: (1) either ignore the noncompli-
ance, thereby encouraging future noncompliance with court orders that
lacked an enforcement mechanism, or (2) attempt to develop a remedy
that would specifically spell out how all communities in the state must
go about providing a "realistic opportunity for low and moderate
income housing." '1
The court chose the second option in Mount Laurel HI.1"
Intruding upon the legislative function, the court proceeded to outline
109. The court based its decision on art. I, . 1, of the New Jersey Constitution of 1947:
All persons are by nature free and independent, and have certain natural and unalienable
rights, among which are those of enjoying and defending life and liberty, of acquiring,
possessing, and protecting property, and of pursuing and obtaining safety and happiness.
Id. at 725 (italics added).
110. Id. at 734.
111. By way of summary, what we have said comes down to this. As a developing
municipality, Mount Laurel must, by its land use regulations, make realistically possible
the opportunity for an appropriate variety and choice of housing for all categories of
people who may desire to live there, of course including those of low and moderate
income. It must permit multifamily housing, without bedroom or similar restrictions,
as well as small dwellings on very small lots, low cost housing of other types and, in
general, high density zoning, without artificial and unjustifiable minimum requirements
as to lot size, building size and the like, to meet the full panoply of these needs.
Certainly when a municipality zones for industry and commerce for local tax benefit
purposes, it without question must zone to permit adequate housing within the means
of the employees involved in such uses. (If planned unit developments are authorized,
one would assume that each must include a reasonable amount of low and moderate
income housing in its residential "mix," unless opportunity for such housing has already
been realistically provided for elsewhere in the municipality.) The amount of land
removed from residential use by allocation to industrial and commercial purposes must
be reasonably related to the present and future potential for such purposes. In other
words, such municipalities must zone primarily for the living welfare of people and not
for the benefit of the local tax rate.
336 A.2d at 731-32.
112. See Southern Burlington Cty. NAACP v. Township of Mt. Laurel, 456 A.2d 390,409-
10 (N.J. 1983).
113. Id. at 410.
114. Id. at 409-10.
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affirmative obligations upon all cities, such as requiring set-asides and
incentive zoning."' If a city failed to adopt such measures, the New
Jersey Supreme Court vested the trial court with the authority to adopt
ordinances for the city, to stop development of projects, and to void
the city's entire zoning plan.1"6 The court also sacrificed the tradi-
tional structure of the judicial system when it required that any future
"Mount Laurel litigation" be assigned only to those judges selected by
the Chief Justice with the approval of the New Jersey Supreme
Court." 7 The proffered reason for this alteration was to develop
consistency in decisions."'
By issuing an opinion with no enforcement "teeth" in Mount
Laurel I, the court found itself facing a very unpalatable choice. The
court arguably chose the lesser of two evils when it chose to act as a
legislative body in Mount Laurel II. In retrospect, it seems the court
might have been better advised to declare the case nonjusticiable as
either a question best resolved in the political arena (i.e., the state
legislature) or as a case with nonjudicially manageable standards.
Other states have faced comparable dilemmas on school funding
issues. 119
The dangers of the Mount Laurel experience were present in
Seattle School District. Like the New Jersey court, the Washington
Supreme Court was asked to deal with a sociopolitical problem that (1)
lacked judicially manageable standards-a remedy could not be
fashioned by the court without usurping the legislative function, and
(2) had an adequate alternative remedy-namely, resort to the political
arena where legislation could have been created to resolve the problem.
The Seattle School District court's ruling, although ultimately
narrower in scope than the Mount Laurel court's ruling, nevertheless
placed an affirmative duty upon a co-equal branch of government to
enact legislation. Accordingly, the ruling suffers from the same
115. Id. at 418-19.
116. Id. at 418-19.
117. Southern Burlington Cty. NAACP, 456 A.2d at 419.
118. Id.
119. See, e.g., Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor, 703 A.2d 1353 (N.H. 1997) (holding
system of financing public education through school taxes assessed in school districts was
disproportionate and unreasonable within meaning of constitutional provision requiring
proportional and reasonable tax assessments). The New Hampshire court's decision prompted
a political outcry in the legislature. To date, the legislature has refused to provide necessary
funding to implement the court's decision. Legislation has been proposed to strip the courts of
jurisdiction over school funding questions. David Brock, Lightning Rod, GOVERNING, Oct. 1998,
at 76. See also Alan Ehrenhalt, Schools + Taxes + Politics = Chaos, GOVERNING, Jan. 1999, at
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infirmities found in Mount Laurel. First, serious questions are raised
about separation of powers. Second, and for practical purposes the
most troublesome problem, the court lacked a judicially enforceable
mechanism to compel legislative compliance.' Had the legislature
not seen fit to increase the level of educational funding, the Washing-
ton Supreme Court would have been in the same predicament as the
New Jersey court. It is unthinkable that any Washington court would
issue an order to individual legislators and the governor enjoining them
to enact and sign into law specific, court-drafted legislation. 121
Third, an adequate alternative remedy was available. Specifically, the
plaintiffs could have fought their battle in the political arena either by
mobilizing state legislative support or by electing legislators who would
fund education at a higher level.
Likewise, in an era where public-private partnerships are common,
the courts have been asked to revisit the wisdom of legislative
enactments concerning such activities in the guise of judicial review.
In CLEAN v. State,'22 opponents of funding for a baseball stadium
for the Seattle Mariners baseball team filed suit against the State
challenging the basis for an emergency clause in the stadium funding
legislation-an emergency clause foreclosed a referendum on the
legislation. The Washington Supreme Court upheld the emergency
clause as necessary for "public peace, health or safety" of the people of
Washington. a12  The court indicated it would not presume to over-
turn the legislature's designation of an emergency unless the legislative
action was "obviously false and a palpable attempt at dissimula-
tion.124
120. The majority tacitly acknowledged the lack of any enforceable mechanism in its
numerous statements to the effect it trusted the legislature to do the right thing. See, e.g., Seattle
Sch. Dist., 90 Wash. 2d at 537, 585 P.2d at 104 ("We have great faith in the Legislature and its
ability to define 'basic education' and a basic program of education and also to fund such
education without reliance upon special excess levies.").
In his dissent, Justice Rosellini reminded the majority the enforcement of the court's decree
was impossible without the court itself violating the constitution. Seattle Sch. Dist., 90 Wash. 2d
at 579, 585 P.2d at 128 (Rosellini, J., dissenting).
121. One is inevitably reminded in this context of the famous and perhaps apocryphal story
of President Andrew Jackson's reaction to the Supreme Court's decision in Worcester v. Georgia,
31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832). When told of the ruling, Jackson reportedly declared: "John
Marshall has made his decision, now let him enforce it." MARQUIS JAMES, THE LIFE OF
ANDREW JACKSON 603 (1938).
122. 130 Wash. 2d 782, 928 P.2d 1054 (1996).
123. Id. at 812, 928 P.2d at 1069.
124. Id. at 808, 928 P.2d at 1066 (quoting State ex rel. Hamilton v. Martin, 173 Wash. 249,
257, 23 P.2d 1, 4 (1933)). See also Brower v. State, 1998 WL 893152 (Wash. Dec. 24, 1998)
(football stadium); Washington Convention and Trade Center v. Evans, 136 Wash. 2d 811, 966
P.2d 1252 (1998) (convention center); Citizens for More Important Things v. King Cty., 131
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The dissent argued for a more intrusive standard, requiring the
legislature to make findings to support the existence of an emergen-
cy.125 These findings presumably would be reviewable by the courts,
offering courts an unfettered opportunity to intrude upon the legislative
process. This would be a profound judicial invasion of the preroga-
tives of a coordinate branch of government and an elementary violation
of the separation of powers doctrine. 126
Courts are also asked to referee political battles between the other
branches as to the extent of their respective powers. In Washington
State Legislature v. Lowry, 27 individual legislators filed suit against
the governor challenging his ability to exercise the veto power over
certain sections of general and appropriations bills. The record on
appeal did not show the legislature sought to override the governor's
vetoes of any of the affected sections.128  The Washington Supreme
Court opinion upheld the governor's ability to veto sections of bills, if
they were formerly complete sections of bills, and his authority to veto
Wash. 2d 411, 932 P.2d 135 (1997) (baseball stadium); City of Kennewick v. Benton Cty., 131
Wash. 2d 768, 935 P.2d 606 (1997) (coliseum); CLEAN v. City of Spokane, 133 Wash. 2d 455,
947 P.2d 1169 (1997) (parking garage), cert. petition filed, 66 USLW 3750 (May 6, 1998, No. 97-
1807); King Cty. v. Taxpayers of King Cty., 133 Wash. 2d 584, 949 P.2d 1260 (1997) (baseball
stadium).
125. CLEAN, 130 Wash. 2d at 833-34, 928 P.2d at 1079 (Sanders, J., dissenting).
126. Indeed, it is at least arguable that Washington's standard of review for the legislature's
determination of an emergency-an "obviously false and palpable attempt at dissimulation,"
CLEAN, 130 Wash. 2d at 808, 928 P.2d at 1066 (quoting State ex. rel. Hamilton v. Martin, 173
Wash. 249, 257, 23 P.2d 1, 4 (1933))-as difficult to meet as it is, also unconstitutionally intrudes
on the legislature's sphere of influence. The Idaho Supreme Court held as much in reviewing
nearly identical circumstances in Idaho State AFL-CIO v. Leroy, 718 P.2d 1129, 1136 (Idaho
1986):
Whether [an actual emergency exists] or not, we hold that the legislature's determina-
tion of an emergency in an act is a policy decision exclusively within the ambit of
legislative authority, and the judiciary cannot second-guess that decision. In the absence
of a legislative invasion of constitutionally protected rights, the judicial branch must
respect and defer to the legislature's exclusive policy decisions. Such is the very nature
of our tripartite representative form of government.
Some Washington legislators have introduced a bill that would cede to the Washington
Supreme Court the authority to review legislative determinations of an emergency both as to the
facts and the law. Washington Senate Bill 6563 provides, in pertinent part, that "[a]ny legislative
measure [not subject to referendum because of a declaration of an emergency] shall be subject to
immediate review by the supreme court both as to the facts asserted and the conclusion drawn
therefrom that such an emergency exists as to justify exempting the measure from referendum."
S. 6563, 55th Leg. Reg. Sess. § 2(3) (Wash. 1998). In its present form, the bill does not identify
who has standing to challenge such a legislative enactment, or what standard of review the courts
should employ. The bill seems to invite the courts to act as a super legislature.
127. 131 Wash. 2d 309, 931 P.2d 885 (1997).
128. Id. at 313, 931 P.2d at 888.
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appropriations items, provided the overall agency appropriation was
reduced by the amount of the item vetoed. 129
In addition to arbitrating interbranch disputes, the courts are
asked to force other branches to act when they have neglected or
refused to address a problem. In Hillis v. Department of Ecology,130
a citizen sought priority attention for his water right application by
writ of mandamus. The application had not been processed by the
State because the legislature had not adequately funded the permit
reviewing segment of the applicable administrative agency. The
Washington Supreme Court reversed a trial court order mandating the
agency process the permit. The court reasoned there was no statutory
or constitutional right to a permit and any court order to process a
permit would inevitably force a court to order the legislature to
appropriate funds to carry out the permitting function. Such an order
would be beyond the authority of the judiciary:
While it may be very tempting for this [clourt to order the
Legislature to appropriate a reasonable amount of funds (or attempt
to do so through court orders to Ecology) so that water rights
applicants could have their requests for water decided in a timely
manner, such action would violate the separation of powers doctrine.
The separation of powers doctrine ensures that the fundamental
functions of each branch of government remain inviolate. The
legislative branch generally has control over appropriations. While
we may find a waiting period of years to be intolerable, we would
find it even more intolerable for the judicial branch of government
to invade the power of the legislative branch. Just because we do
not think the legislators have acted wisely or responsibly does not
give us the right to assume their duties or to substitute our
judgment for theirs. The judiciary is the branch of government that
is empowered to interpret statutes, not enact them. While there are
special situations when the courts can and should order the
expenditure of funds, specific appropriation to fund a statutory
right, not involving constitutional rights or judicial functions, is
normally beyond our powers to order. If every time we decided that
the Legislature had not appropriated enough funds to an agency for
a given purpose we could rule that the agency was "arbitrary or
capricious" for failing to act and order the agency to act, then the
funding of all agency action would be effectively shifted from the
Legislature to the courts.13 1
129. Id. at 331, 931 P.2d at 897.
130. 131 Wash. 2d 373, 932 P.2d 139 (1997).
131. Id. at 389-90, 932 P.2d at 147-48. (Sanders, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part)
(citations omitted). The dissent, however, would have ordered the agency to process the permit,
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Similarly, a contentious sociopolitical controversy like term limits
may prompt litigation to compel the courts to resolve public policy
controversies not addressed by the political branches. In Gerberding v.
Munro,3 2 a group of prominent Washington citizens and incumbent
legislators filed an original action for a writ of mandamus to challenge
the constitutionality of Washington's term limits law enacted by
initiative. The Washington Supreme Court held the statute was
unconstitutional because it prescribed additional qualifications for
constitutional officers when only the constitution can prescribe such
qualifications.133
A very troubling recent case indicates how judicial involvement in
an issue can place the courts squarely in the center of a general societal
problem. In Washington Homeless Coalition v. Department of Social &
Health Services,'34 various advocates for the homeless brought an
action against Washington's social service agency alleging that
homeless children had a statutory and constitutional right to a plan to
alleviate homelessness and that the State was obligated to fund it.
A majority of the Washington Supreme Court determined the
child welfare plan of the State's social services agency did not meet the
statutory imperative to protect "homeless, dependent, or neglected
children."' 35  The majority acknowledged the statutory directive did
not create a right to a specific kind of service, but determined the
agency had a mandatory statutory duty to devise a plan that, at a
minimum, provided for prevention services, emergency programs, and
assistance to families to obtain affordable housing.' 36 The supreme
court also held juvenile courts, in deciding whether to place a child in
foster care, had the authority to order housing assistance to children
and families if lack of housing was a primary factor in placing a child
out of the home. 137  The supreme court's opinion is silent on the
question of whether similar separate plans are necessary for dependent
and neglected children.138 In effect, the Washington Supreme Court,
not the governor, the Department of Social and Health Services, nor
notwithstanding the intrusion on the legislature's constitutional budgetary role. Id. at 410, 932
P.2d at 157.
132. 134 Wash. 2d 188, 949 P.2d 1366 (1998).
133. Id. at 211, 949 P.2d at 1377-78.
134. 133 Wash. 2d 894, 949 P.2d 1291 (1997).
135. WASH. REV. CODE § 74.13.020(2) (1998); Washington Homeless Coalition, 133 Wash.
2d at 912-14, 949 P.2d at 1301.
136. Washington Homeless Coalition, 133 Wash. 2d at 910-12, 949 P.2d at 1300-01.
137. Id. at 924-25, 949 P.2d at 1307-08.
138. Id. at 944, 949 P.2d at 1316-17 (Durham, C.J., dissenting).
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the legislature,139 established general state policy on homeless chil-
dren.
The Chief Justice dissented from the majority opinion, contending
the adequacy of the agency plan was not justiciable. The dissent noted
the statute was a policy statement and did not create an enforceable
duty; the dissent further noted the majority's decision placed the courts
in the position of micromanaging services and would inevitably lead
the courts to intrude upon the legislature's constitutional budgetary
power. 140
The Washington Supreme Court in CLEAN, Washington State
Legislature, and Hillis exhibited an admirable restraint by declining to
intrude upon the constitutional authority of a coordinate branch of
government and by generally rejecting invitations such as that of the
CLEAN or Hillis dissents actively to breach separation of powers or to
become embroiled in political controversy. By contrast, in Gerberding,
the supreme court did intrude into a lively political battle. Similarly,
as in Seattle School District, the Washington Homeless Coalition Court
evidenced a new inclination to place the judiciary in the middle of
intractable sociopolitical controversies. Such action compels the
judiciary to undertake detailed steps to address such controversies,
when the discretion to undertake such steps is within the constitutional
prerogatives of the other branches.
By embroiling itself in sociopolitical controversies, the Washington
judiciary may be forced to craft remedies inconsistent with the
Washington Constitution, statutes, and the common law. Worse,
venturing into the political thicket may diminish the courts' reputation
for independence and impartiality, thereby diminishing the public's
respect for the courts as a separate branch of government. The
following cases illustrate the temptation to expand judicial power,
perhaps without even being aware of doing so, because of a perceived
need to "do justice."
B. Expansion of the Courts' Remedial Power
Not only do courts expand judicial power by resolving specific
controversies best entrusted to the other branches of government, but
by also creating new avenues for the exercise of judicial power. By
expanding judicial remedies available to litigants, the courts assume an
ever greater role in the government of our society.
139. Id. at 946-47, 949 P.2d at 1318 (Durham, C.J., dissenting).
140. Id. at 944-47, 949 P.2d at 1316-7 (Durham, C.J., dissenting).
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In Saldin Securities, Inc. v. Snohomish County,14 ' the Washing-
ton Supreme Court held it had jurisdiction over a land use controversy
by virtue of a constitutional writ of certiorari, invoking the court's
inherent authority under article IV, section 6 of the Washington
Constitution to review issues. In so doing, the court chose to ignore
a plain legislative directive to permit judicial review of only final, as
opposed to interlocutory, determinations made pursuant to the State
Environmental Protection Act.142  Departing from the limited
remedial scope of the writ of certiorari as it existed at the time of
Washington's statehood in 1889, the court held that the writ could
issue even though an adequate remedy existed at law, as long as the
petitioner could show "good cause" why that remedy did not work in
that particular case.' 43  The writ also applied to any governmental
decisionmaker in Washington, not just to inferior judicial tribu-
nals. 4 4  The revival of this ancient and traditionally extremely
limited common law remedy creates authority for a free-ranging
judicial charge to right any wrong wherever found.
Similarly, in Gossett v. Farmers Insurance Co. of Washington,145
the Washington Supreme Court held its common law equitable
decisions could be challenged collaterally on constitutional grounds to
provide a remedy not otherwise available. The court analyzed a due
process/equal protection challenge to an earlier decision that added a
further equitable exception to the American Rule on attorney fees in
civil litigation.'46 Thus, the court invited constitutional challenges
to well-settled common law or equitable principles and significantly
expanded the range of Washington constitutional law to overturn
judicial decisions on grounds identical to those employed to analyze the
constitutionality of statutes, rules, or ordinances.
As these cases illustrate, the courts must be cautious about
expanding judicial power by increasing the opportunity and scope of
judicial action. A Washington judiciary with a charter to review all
141. 134 Wash. 2d 288, 949 P.2d 370 (1998).
142. WASH. REV. CODE § 43.21C.075(6)(c) (1998) provides: "Judicial review under this
chapter shall without exception be of the governmental action together with its accompanying
environmental determinations."
143. Saldin Sec., 134 Wash. 2d at 293, 949 P.2d at 373.
144. Id. at 305-08, 949 P.2d at 379-81 (Talmadge, J., concurring).
145. 133 Wash. 2d 954, 948 P.2d 1264 (1997).
146. Id. at 977-78, 948 P.2d at 1276. The American Rule on attorney fees in civil litigation
provides that a prevailing party may recover fees as costs only if authorized by statute, contract,
or equity. State ex rel Macri v. City of Bremerton, 8 Wash. 2d 93, 113, 111 P.2d 612, 621
(1941). See generally Philip A. Talmadge, The Award of Attorneys' Fees in Civil Litigation in
Washington, 16 GONZ. L. REV. 57, 57-59 (1980).
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actions of any subordinate level of government, as Saldin implies, or
a judiciary analyzing its common law precedents under constitutional
principles, as in Gossett, is a judiciary without restraint.
The lesson of some of the cases involving political-social
controversies is that the courts can often effectively address a constitu-
tional or statutory violation, but may choose to leave the precise
outlines of the remedy to the more political branches of government.
When the remedy requested involves placing an affirmative'47 duty
upon a co-equal branch of government, the court-more than
ever-should be cautious about its involvement in the dispute. The
reasons for this are numerous: (1) separation of powers concerns; (2)
lack of an enforcement mechanism to compel compliance; and (3)
availability of remedies elsewhere, namely in the political arena.
Where a viable political remedy may resolve a litigant's concern, the
courts should be reluctant to intrude until it is manifest that the
political branches will not or cannot resolve the issue. As in Seattle
School District and Hillis, the judiciary's involvement, if any, should be
confined to compelling the political institutions to act.
V. A NEW GENERAL PRINCIPLE OF JUDICIAL RESTRAINT FOR
GENERAL JURISDICTION COURTS
Having reviewed examples of actual cases in which Washington
courts have fashioned expansive remedies or addressed sociopolitical
questions with varying degrees of judicial activity, I now offer a general
set of principles for evaluating whether, or to what extent, general
jurisdiction courts should resolve a controversy. While the entire
judiciary should apply these maxims of restraint, the Washington
Supreme Court has an excellent point in its review process for applying
these principles-its caseload is largely discretionary and it may choose
not to take cases for review.'48
Judicial restraint appropriately comes into play in questions with
significant sociopolitical overtones. Notwithstanding their general
jurisdiction and the "imperative to decide," Washington courts should
be reticent about deciding significant sociopolitical controversies,
particularly where viable remedies for litigants exist in the political
process and elsewhere. The courts should defer to the more partisan
147. "Affirmative" is defined as requiring positive action, as opposed to invalidating or
negating current action. In the legislative context, "affirmative" means mandating that legislation
be enacted, as opposed to simply striking down legislation.
148. See, e.g., WASH. R. APP. P. 4.2(a) (direct review of trial court decisions); WASH. R.
APP. P. 13.5(b) (review of Court of Appeals decision). The court meets monthly in its
departments to screen cases for review. These principles should be applied in such a setting.
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branches of government on such questions. Those branches are better
situated institutionally to make policy judgments necessary to execute
political decisions. They can hold hearings to affirmatively seek the
input of a variety of interest groups. They, more than the judiciary,
can better broker the competing interests that characterize a democratic
political process.149
The appropriate test for deciding whether, and to what extent, the
courts may address a problem should be a composite test with elements
addressing the timing of court involvement as well as the nature of the
decision subject to review. The test should compel litigants and courts
alike to understand that the bar has been raised for obtaining judicial
review of sociopolitical controversies. It should compel litigants and
judges to carefully analyze the proper role of the courts in such
controversies, both as to liability and remedies. I suggest that
considerations of exhaustion of remedies and justiciability are
appropriate to the task.
A. Exhaustion of Remedies
This first question is essentially a procedural matter relating to the
finality of the lower court's decision. General jurisdiction courts
should employ an initial screening test to determine if the litigants
have exhausted available remedies before seeking judicial resolution of
a case. Borrowing from the administrative law context, courts should
employ a doctrine akin to exhaustion of administrative remedies in
deciding whether to address a controversy with substantial political
overtones which affect the actions of other branches of government or
149. As Chief Justice Durham stated in Washington Homeless Coalition v. Dept. of Social
and Health Services:
Regardless of how firmly any of may personally support the appropriation of
government funds for housing assistance for homeless families, such policy determina-
tions are not the prerogative of the judicial branch of government. The judicial branch
is by design, in many respects, the branch most distant from the political fray and least
capable of resolving complex social problems with significant political and budgetary
overtones. We cannot hold public hearings to investigate issues and hear from the
myriad of competing interests. We are ill-equipped to balance the competing visions
of such interest groups. As a result, we should be most reluctant to involve ourselves
in such political issues. We should leave their resolution to the political branches whose
processes are more amenable to political give and take and the development of social
policy. Conscientious observance of the separation of powers doctrine, "the dominant
principle of the American political system[,]" requires no less.
133 Wash. 2d 894, 946, 949 P.2d 1291, 1318 (1997) (Durham, C.J., dissenting) (citations
omitted). See also CLEAN, 130 Wash. 2d at 797, 928 P.2d at 1061 ("The Legislature with its
staff and committees is the branch of government better suited to monitor and assess contempo-
rary attitudes than are the courts.").
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large-scale societal interests. The litigants in such controversies must
demonstrate that they have exhausted available political remedies,
including constitutional remedies or amendment/repeal of legislation,
before seeking court involvement. Obviously, the definition for
inaction by the other branches of government does not involve a
bright-line temporal test of one month, one year, or the like, but
assumes some good faith effort by the litigants to employ available
constitutional or political procedures. As with the doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies, the political remedies available
to the litigants must be effective, and exhaustion is not necessary if
such acts would be futile.
The United States Supreme Court has imposed exhaustion as a
prudential matter in a variety of contexts. For example, the Court
considered a claim that a tribal court had no jurisdiction to adjudicate
claims of a driver, who was not a tribal member, for injuries arising
from an automobile accident on a state highway that ran through
reservation land. The Court announced what it called "a prudential
exhaustion rule" in deference to the capacity of tribal courts to explain
the basis for tribal court jurisdiction.' so
Another example of the application of prudential constraint may
be found in the federal courts' standing jurisprudence. In considering
standing, the United States Supreme Court has observed "prudential
limitations on [the] exercise [of jurisdiction] . . .founded in concern
about the proper-and properly limited-role of the courts in a
democratic society."' 1
Thus, under proper principles of exhaustion, the litigants in
Washington Legislature v. Lowry should have first resorted to available
political remedies by seeking an override of the governor's veto.
Similarly, the litigants in Gerberding may have failed the exhaustion
test by not introducing a bill to amend the term limits initiative.15 2
On the other hand, the litigants in Baker v. Carr probably satisfied the
doctrine because they had no viable political remedy in legislatures
gerrymandered in favor of rural interests. Similarly, the litigants in
Seattle School District and Hillis may have satisfied the test because
long-standing legislative inaction on the issue demonstrated the
150. Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 450 (1997) (finding suit in federal court
premature until tribal court has full opportunity to determine its own jurisdiction).
151. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975) (citing Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249,
255-56 (1953)).
152. These litigants, however, had a strong futility argument where the initiative measure
could be amended only by a two-thirds vote of both houses of the legislature. See WASH.
CONST. art. II, § i.
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indifference of the political institutions toward the issue. This
exhaustion doctrine requires the best efforts of the affected parties. If
the political process simply does not afford a practical remedy,
exhaustion is satisfied.153
A policy requiring exhaustion of political or constitutional
remedies advances judicial economy and compels the other branches of
government to make their best efforts to resolve an issue before the
courts become involved. This encourages responsible action by those
branches of government.
B. Justiciability
Assuming the litigants have exhausted available remedies, there is
no requirement the courts must resolve every controversy. The
judiciary can, and should, decide to resolve significant sociopolitical
questions only when the courts can effectively articulate the controversy
and a remedy for it. This set of principles is designed to compel
careful evaluation of judicial involvement in every controversy and to
conserve judicial involvement in sociopolitical controversies to those
situations where judicial resolution is necessary and effective.
Considering Washington's tests for a political question, justiciabil-
ity, and ripeness, it is more appropriate for a general jurisdiction court
system to abandon these separate doctrines and blend them into a
single standard for justiciability. The courts need such an overarching
set of threshold principles for determining whether to decide a case
with substantial political overtones. These principles should be applied
aggressively by general jurisdiction courts to exclude certain controver-
sies from judicial consideration. To further reinforce the need for
attention to this analysis, I would, by an addition to the pleading rules
in our rules of civil procedure, require the plaintiff in any action to
plead affirmatively the action is justiciable, much as the federal civil
rules require parties to plead the basis for federal jurisdiction."5 4
Such a rule would place the question of justiciability at issue and
thereby compel the parties and the courts to contemplate and address
what previously has been given too little attention-the propriety of
judicial involvement in the controversy. In this way, a body of case
153. See, e.g., Smoke v. City of Seattle, 132 Wash. 2d 214, 224-27, 937 P.2d 186, 190-92
(1997) (excusing exhaustion of administrative remedies if the administrative agency is not
empowered to grant the necessary relief or the administrative remedy cannot alleviate the harmful
consequences of the governmental activity at issue).
154. FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a).
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law on justiciability in our general jurisdiction courts will develop by
necessity.
The court should resolve the question of justiciability by
addressing three key questions. First, is the party litigating the issue
one who has a real, nontheoretical interest in the outcome of the
decision? This question is designed to ensure a party has a live
interest in a real controversy. Courts should not decide issues that are
not "live" without real parties with real interests at stake. This rule in
effect creates a case or controversy requirement;' 5 our courts may
then look to the rich federal case or controversy jurisprudence for
guidance on close questions. The exceptions that have swallowed up
the general rule of mootness should be avoided.' 56
Second, does the judicial resolution of an issue affect a core
function of a coordinate constitutional branch? This question is
designed to focus the courts on separation of powers concerns so as toavoid impinging upon the core functions of coordinate constitutional
branches of government. The overlap of functions among the branches
of government is often a gray area without easily demarcated parame-
ters. The courts must be sensitive to the interests at issue when
resolving problems in this sphere. For example, in Lowry, both the
legislative and executive branches jockeyed for particular advantage
when asking the courts to define the scope of the governor's line item
veto power. More troubling yet is the invitation by those branches to
the judiciary to address the issue at all.'57 Once the principle is
established that courts will referee conflicts between the executive and
the legislature, the door is opened for the courts to referee additional
conflicts of this nature.
Finally, can the judiciary articulate coherent, manageable
standards for the resolution of the controversy and provide effective
relief? This is the most critical question of the justiciability test. This
155. See supra note 27.
156. As noted previously, supra text accompanying notes 85-87, the exception for "matters
of continuing and substantial public interest" has largely swallowed up the rule on mootness. The
exception should be curtailed. Only in those cases where review would always be unavailable to
the litigants by the nature of the case at stake should the exception apply. See, e.g., In re
Detention of Dydasco, 135 Wash. 2d 943, 959 P.2d 1111 (1998). Dydasco illustrates the point
because, in any challenge to the lack of seventy-two hours notice, temporal reality will render the
case moot.
157. Legislation is plainly the core function of the legislative branch; the governor exercises
a legislative function in using the veto. Allied Daily Newspapers of Wash. v. Eikenberry, 121
Wash. 2d 205, 213, 848 P.2d 1258, 1262 (1993). Thus, only "rarely" and "reluctantly" should
courts intrude in such disputes. Wash. State Legis. v. Lowry, 131 Wash. 2d 309, 320, 931 P.2d
885, 891 (1997).
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question compels the courts carefully to assess the possible remedies
the court can order and whether those remedies are judicially manage-
able. Whether the courts can adequately address the issue and
dispense an appropriate, effective remedy is an extremely critical
concern in political cases. For example, the Seattle School District
decision compelled court involvement in such intractable political
issues as the definition of basic education, student achievement, and
the adequacy of educational funding. The court in Hillis also posed
the proper question when it asked if courts could order the legislature
to spend money on a program not constitutionally mandated. In
Washington Homeless Coalition, the judiciary would solve the problem
of homelessness for children by mandating the development, and
presumably the funding, of a plan to abate homelessness. The scope
of the involvement in the politics of housing-identifying, building,
operating, maintaining, and funding housing for low-income people
with children-is truly mammoth in dimension and a task beyond the
capability of even the most well-intentioned court.
Courts must assess whether a potential remedy for a statutory or
constitutional wrong in political cases appropriately resolves the
problem brought before the courts. The remedy ordered must be the
least intrusive remedy; that is, the least intrusive upon the coordinate
branches of government, but still consistent with resolving the
problem. In the absence of the ability to articulate and implement
such a remedy, the courts should be reluctant to intrude upon the
issue.
VI. CONCLUSION
Within their carefully delineated constitutional sphere, the courts
must function in a vigorous and independent fashion without fear of
attack or intrusion by the other branches of government. General
jurisdiction courts must be willing to define their core functions with
care to prevent the other branches, with their more political and
majoritarian focus, from trampling upon the constitutional imperative
of the judiciary to uphold individual liberties, even when such efforts
may be unpopular.
At the same time, however, the judiciary must be wise enough to
restrain itself from becoming an unnecessary and inappropriate
participant in every sociopolitical controversy, thereby diminishing the
respect afforded the courts for their dispassionate impartiality. In an
era where every wrong must have its day in court and some judges are
all too eager to have the judiciary address every societal issue, the
concept of judicial restraint, without the ideological baggage of the left
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or right, bears reconsideration. The temptation of general jurisdiction
courts to right all wrongs, to undertake what Justice Kennedy described
as "a power grab in a black robe," ' should be resisted. In our
constitutional scheme, many issues are better left to the more political
branches of government to decide. Where the courts become
embroiled in political controversies, the legitimacy of the courts, their
aura of impartiality and independence, are apt to suffer as each new
political issue has its day in the sun. If the courts are to survive with
the core constitutional functions of the judiciary intact, it is crucial for
general jurisdiction courts to employ an appropriate paradigm for
deciding if, and when, to resolve sociopolitical questions.
158. See Biskupic, supra note 22.
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